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1  Introduction 
 
One of the oddly positive effects of global warming is that it has given the world the 
opportunity to build a more comprehensive and inclusive economic model. 
Commentary by the editors of Nature (‘Markets can save forests’ 2008) 
1.1  The green economy, green growth and natural resource 
financialization 
In recent years, widespread uncertainty around global economic and environmental futures 
has contributed to growing advocacy for a global ‘greening’ of the economy involving the 
coordinated establishment of pro-environment economic policies and programmes around 
the world (Barbier 2010; UNDESA 2009). Following the dominant framings favoured by the 
United Nations (UN) and partners, the term ‘green economy’ refers to a flexible policy toolkit 
that includes recommendations for environmental regulations, market-based and financial 
instruments, and voluntary initiatives to promote capitalisation of pro-environment goods and 
services and stimulate green economic growth (UNEMG 2011). Along these lines, a number 
of UN-affiliated international and regional intergovernmental organisations and development 
banks have developed their own complementary green growth strategies and frameworks 
that link up with the UN approach through a number of collaborations, agreements, 
mechanisms and partnerships (AfDB 2014; Fay 2012; UNDESA 2013). 
 
In this report, the terms ‘green economy’ and ‘green growth’ are used at times to reference 
the same thing – to refer to the common dominant principles of these approaches, namely: 
 
 Environmentally sustainable economic growth – the idea that economic growth 
and environmental integrity can be complementary and achievable goals within the 
appropriate market and regulatory contexts 
 Socially inclusive green growth – the idea that green economic growth should be 
pro-poor and maximise both immediate and local benefits to reduce poverty and 
vulnerability and long-term global benefits towards sustainability 
 Universality – the idea that transitions to green economies should be universal to 
realise a cumulative global transition towards sustainability 
 Flexibility – there is no single green growth model; green economic strategies will 
vary by region and country based on context, capabilities, preferences and funding. 
 
A key area of the green economy approach centres on advancing policy reforms, 
programmes, platforms, financial instruments, markets and mechanisms that facilitate 
international investment and trading in a variety of financialized ‘natural capital’ products and 
services derived through assessment of intact and healthy terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems, particularly in resource-rich lower-income countries. With a conceptual basis in 
environmental economics, the logic underlying the practice – henceforth referred to as 
natural resource financialization, or NRF – is that economic growth and environmental 
preservation are only compatible when the environmental functions are priced and marketed 
correctly (Death 2014; Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 1989). 
 
A variety of ecosystemic properties and functions are the subject of financialization efforts 
and initiatives. These include, but are not limited to, coastal protection services; terrestrial 
and marine biodiversity; marine and freshwater purification services; terrestrial, marine, and 
coastal carbon sequestration, and generalised or bundled environmental and ecosystem 
services (Natural Capital Project 2015). Since the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, compliance-based 
markets for certified carbon offsets – derived financial instruments that are linked to 
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regulatory requirements for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that, when traded 
across international borders, allow continued emission of GHGs in industrial contexts in 
exchange for climate mitigation activities elsewhere – have been particularly integral to 
global strategies for climate change mitigation, and are one of the most vigorously promoted 
green economy policies (McAfee 2015; Silver 2015; World Bank 2012). In addition, a number 
of voluntary markets for financialized environmental products and services have arisen as 
well, under various trading and certification schemes. 
 
Stakeholders in the UN system, multilateral banks and donor agencies, the private sector, 
and the public sector are intended to use the green economy toolkit to initiate reforms that 
will remove obstacles to the ‘greening’ of economic growth and will contribute to a global 
systemic transition towards sustainability (UNEMG 2011; World Bank 2012). These reforms 
necessitate collaboration among donors, international banking and finance, environmental 
organisations, formal governance institutions, national governments and civil society, and 
frequently build upon existing regional-level planning structures and national-level 
environmental programmes and protected area (PA) networks. National programmes are 
expanded through environmental policy reforms to incorporate, for example, offset schemes 
for maintaining biodiversity and sequestering atmospheric carbon, ecological ‘rehabilitation’ 
and ‘payment for ecosystem services’ approaches, and expansive bundles of policies and 
programmes under institutional arrangements and trading mechanisms like the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol and programmes that help countries 
develop national strategies for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD/REDD+) (Leach and Scoones, forthcoming; Sullivan 2012). Carbon and 
environmental services trading through linkages to such programmes are appealing to the 
governments of many lower-income countries. This is because these programmes are 
designed to attract external investment in green infrastructure development, and incorporate 
schemes for payments for ecosystem services (PES) to local communities with the goal of 
compensating for the local costs of environmental preservation and contributing to poverty 
alleviation (Michaelowa 2013; Silver 2015). 
1.2  Policy framings and challenges 
The broad appeals of market-based green economy approaches to environmental 
conservation and development lie in a bundled package of policy promises – to mitigate the 
effects of global climate change, to preserve crucial ecosystem functions, and to capture 
what are termed ‘triple-win’ opportunities for achieving socially inclusive environmental 
sustainability, economic growth, and poverty alleviation through policy reform and 
coordinated action (UNDP 2012). The triple win of the green economy also encompasses 
promises of scale. For the international community, these programmes promise to make both 
the global economy and the global environment ‘work’ to support one another, while 
providing offsets to mitigate environmentally destructive industrial activities. For lower-
income countries with large endowments of natural resources, these schemes promise new 
means of financing national development programmes and preserving natural ecosystems, 
which have become framed increasingly in terms of capital assets. On a local level, these 
policies promise to manifest in the establishment of programmes that will preserve natural 
resources, enhance livelihoods, increase resilience in the face of environmental hazards, and 
generate streams of income for cash-strapped local communities to invest in infrastructure 
and development initiatives. 
 
Yet, green development approaches, and NRF initiatives in particular, remain controversial, 
and the environmental, economic, and social justice-oriented projections of their proponents 
are widely contested. On a basic level, policymaking for climate compatible development 
often occurs without guidance on means of assessing unanticipated conflicts, trade-offs, and 
synergies that arise as programmes and projects are implemented, and evidence-based 
8 
 
studies that objectively document triple-win outcomes are rare (Baker, Milner-Gulland and 
Leader-Williams 2012; Suckall, Stringer and Tompkins 2014; Tompkins et al. 2013). 
 
Further contestation results from differing and conflicting notions around the concept and 
measurement of ‘sustainability’; the environmental implications of economic growth; the 
disproportionate fiscal risk faced by relatively politically weak national governments levying 
the future economic performance of derivatives based on the health of natural ecosystems 
for aid; from the fact that policies fostering natural resource financialization carry profound 
implications for social and material dimensions of local livelihoods in lower-income countries, 
and from the potential of NRF reforms to promote inequitable property regimes as a result of 
new policies that shift rights to access and control of land and resources away from direct 
users to the state and/or private investors. 
1.3  The green economy and conflict potential in Southern Africa 
Development policy and conflict literatures highlight the importance of so-called ‘high-value’ 
natural resources to sustainable development planning, emerging conflict, and security 
issues. High-value resources are commodities that, in their natural state, have high revenue 
potential (Douglas and Alie 2014: 271). While this category of resources conventionally 
includes mostly extractive products such as gold, oil, natural gas and diamonds, for example, 
it could be argued that NRF policies are creating a new class comprising non-extractive high-
value conservation resources – monetised natural capital assets – on which environmental 
derivatives are based. In the process of realising policy reforms to support carbon or 
biodiversity offset schemes, PES schemes, expansive policy packages such as national 
REDD+ programmes, and other investment schemes, conflicts can cross scales and be 
catalysed at multiple jurisdictional levels. 
1.4  The scope, structure and limitations of the report 
This report explores existing literature covering policy approaches to the green economy; 
regional and national green economy policy reforms; NRF-specific concerns related to these 
reforms; specific project dynamics, and incidences of conflict, in order to determine the 
broader implications of green economy NRF policies for emerging conflicts in Southern 
Africa. 
 
Geographically, this report focuses on the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region and particular policy transitions, national environmental plans and NRF-
oriented conservation policies implemented in three SADC member states – Madagascar, 
Tanzania and South Africa. The temporal scope of this report is limited to recent NRF-
oriented policy transitions around policies implemented in these settings between 1990 and 
2015. 
 
In the context of international conservation planning and policy reform, multi-level conflicts 
can emerge through numerous pathways (Redpath et al. 2013; Young et al. 2010). This 
report focuses on three areas of potential policy-related conflict in particular: (1) conflict that 
arises due to contradictory or contested policy objectives, (2) conflict that arises around 
trans-border issues related to policy reforms in the Southern African region and (3) conflict 
that arises around shifting control of territory and/or resources in particular places or sites of 
intervention. 
 
The report will address the following seven broad questions in relation to the international 
green economy movement, NRF policies, and conflict on different – but linked – jurisdictional 
levels: 
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1. What does green economy policy mean in relation to the roles of different  groups of 
stakeholders, and in relation to the concepts of scarcity, sustainability and 
development? 
2. What is the role of NRF in the broader evolution green economy policy at 
international, regional (SADC) and national levels?  
3. How have the governments of Madagascar, Tanzania and South Africa and their 
development partners interpreted and translated global and SADC-level policies, 
directives and agreements into national-level environmental policy?  
4. What forms have green economy/NRF projects taken in these three national 
contexts?  
5. How is the governance structure of national-level programmes and projects shaped 
by different national political and economic contexts?  
6. What forms do emerging conflicts take in the context of NRF policy implementation, 
and in turn, what are the policy implications of these conflicts? 
7. How do green economy/NRF policy reforms intersect with conventional modes of 
environmental conservation such as ‘fortress’ and ‘community-based’ approaches? 
 
While this report seeks to be comprehensive in addressing the above questions, it is by no 
means exhaustive and is limited by a number of factors related to ongoing planning 
processes, bureaucratic complexity and a lack of transparency across levels. The green 
economy is an emerging and incomplete process. Policy reform involves creating linkages to 
international mechanisms and markets that are still in conceptual stages, are incomplete, or 
under negotiation. A good example of this is the proposed REDD+ mechanism, a forest 
carbon trading mechanism that is already the basis of many emerging national environmental 
strategies and demonstration projects yet remains incomplete and under negotiation. 
Therefore, even though one may examine the social dynamics of, for example, the 
development of a national REDD+ strategy or a REDD-oriented local forestry project, one 
cannot yet be certain how these observed dynamics will be affected in the future once the 
mechanism is fully realised and later adjusted. 
 
Likewise, regional and national policy frameworks for green economy/green growth reforms 
are also under development, and in some instances, just being initiated. Therefore current 
national and sub-national programmes and projects to support green economy/NRF 
transitions are overwhelmingly ‘demonstration’ or ‘pilot’ projects, experiments in how to make 
ecology and society follow the rules of neoclassical economics. Particularly on a project 
level, policy implementation, evaluation and reporting lacks consistency and transparency. 
This is particularly so in regard to problems and conflicts that often arise in the context of 
implementation but do not support the dominant policy framings relating to the ‘triple win’. 
1.5  Case studies from Madagascar, Tanzania and South Africa 
This report uses case studies from three countries within the SADC region to illustrate how 
green economy transitions and NRF policies intersect with national political and conservation 
policy histories, and are associated with emerging conflicts and conflict potentials in different 
contexts within the region. These studies include: 
 
Biodiversity offsetting and ilmenite mining in south-eastern Madagascar. The example 
from Madagascar focuses biodiversity offsetting and related processes and activities by Rio 
Tinto/QIT Madagascar Minerals (QMM), a mining company co-owned by the government of 
Madagascar and a multinational extractives company, intending to offset environmental 
damage caused by extensive mineral sands mining activities in Mandena near the town of 
Fort Dauphin located on the south-eastern tip of Madagascar. This case explores 
implications of the ‘emerging nexus’ of multinational extractive activities, biodiversity 
conservation and NRF in the context of international green economy transitions, and 
demonstrates how multiple dimensions of NRF (e.g. environmental accounting, carbon 
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sequestration, biodiversity offsetting, PES) can be incorporated into a single offsetting 
scheme that can enhance potential for local conflict in circumstances of persistent social and 
economic inequality. This case highlights important processes around the sub-national 
‘unfolding’ of sustainable development and green growth strategies, including the relative 
roles of states, private sector actors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and local 
populations in facilitating green growth schemes, and specifically how NRF and offsetting 
can buttress relationships between diverse groups of actors in low-income countries. This 
case additionally underscores the ways in which NRF, in practice, can blur distinctions 
between environmental stewardship and environmental degradation; different NRF market 
domains, and social inclusion and exclusion in particular project contexts. 
 
The intersection of community-based forest management (CBFM) and emerging 
REDD+ policy in Tanzania. The example from Tanzania focuses on conflict potentials at the 
intersection of decentralised CBFM and emerging REDD+ policy in the context of the Suledo 
Forest Reserve in Tanzania. In recent decades, Tanzania has built an international 
reputation as a leader in decentralised, community-based forest and wildlife management. 
However, emerging REDD+ policies are at odds with CBFM; there is a stark difference 
between the idea of managing a forest to maintain it as ‘standing carbon’ under the national 
REDD+ strategy, and managing a forest for multiple and flexible purposes based on the 
needs and priorities of local communities in negotiation with other stakeholders along the 
lines of CBFM as epitomised in the Suledo Forest Reserve. This ‘policy paradox’ has begun 
to contribute to a retrenchment of centralised top-down approaches to forest management in 
Tanzania, and, for the residents/managers of the Suledo Forest Reserve, increasing conflict 
with administrators over governance, rights and benefits of forest management. 
 
Collaboration, conflict and payments for environmental/ecosystem services (PES) in 
policy around planning the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation Area in 
South Africa and Lesotho. The example from South Africa and Lesotho focuses on 
transnational dynamics and conflict around planning for the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier 
Conservation and Development Area (MDTFCA), a collaborative trans-boundary PA that is 
operated jointly between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Lesotho and is 
oriented around bio-regional conservation and payments for environmental/ecosystem 
services around water resources. This case demonstrates how planning conflicts between 
the planning committees of South Africa and Lesotho reflect the fact that, despite portrayals 
of their collaboration over the MDTFCA as promoting peace and international cooperation, 
uneven partnerships can lead to conflict. As demonstrated in the case of the MDTFCA, the 
international popularity and ‘win-win’ promise of PES and other financialization instruments 
can be applied by competing actors in conflictual policy situations to legitimate claims and 
positions, and dominate planning relationships and processes.   
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2  Building and governing the green economy: 
key concepts, frameworks and institutions 
in green economy transitions 
2.1  Policy framings and the role of natural resource 
financialization (NRF) in the green economy 
Broadly speaking, the terms ‘green growth’ and ‘green economy’ encompass a number of 
approaches to integrating economic and environmental policy concerns that articulate 
alternate growth schemes to account for and mediate, through economic means and 
environmental governance transitions, human impacts on the biosphere. These schemes 
and transitions have varying policy implications across scales and sectors (Tienhaara 2014). 
In other words, the green economy means different things to different people, institutions, 
organisations, governments and disciplines, and is broad reaching in its policy significance. 
 
Although it gained substantial political traction in the late 2000s, ‘green economy’ is not a 
new term. It originated with the rising discipline of environmental economics in the 1980s, 
and was discussed in a 1989 report produced for the UK Department of the Environment 
entitled Blueprint for a Green Economy (Pearce et al. 1989). The authors of Blueprint sought 
to engage with the now-classic conception of sustainable development put forth in the 
Brundtland Report, Our Common Future: ‘…to ensure that [development] meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ 
(Death 2014; Drexhage and Murphy 2010; WCED 1987: 8). 
 
The foundations of the vision of the green economy advanced by the UN and allied global 
environmental and development agencies today are based strongly in conventional 
development economics, environmental economics and, to a weaker extent, in ecological 
economics.1 The dominant framing considers ‘economy’, ‘environment’ and ‘society’ as 
conceptually discrete and distinguishable domains, with nature and natural processes framed 
as neglected dimensions of an ‘immanent market-world’ (McAfee 2015: 239). The underlying 
logic is that economic growth and environmental preservation are compatible policy 
objectives, but only when environmental assets and functions are priced correctly. When 
they are not, environmental degradation results from market failures and accounting 
omissions (Death 2014; Pearce et al. 1989; Ring et al. 2010). 
 
Following this framing, if environmental services such as clean water, clean air, erosion 
control, coastal protection and carbon sequestration are ‘free of charge,’ then they receive 
too little policy consideration and human beneficiaries will ultimately undervalue the 
ecosystems and processes that produce them because ‘external costs’ of exploitation will not 
figure into individual decisions about the use of natural resources, making them prone to 
degradation (Costanza et al. 1997). Proponents of green economy reforms contend that 
market failures and resulting degrading behaviour has led to the emergence of a ‘tragedy of 
                                               
1 Although dominated by market-centric development economics and environmental economic thinking, important green 
economy concepts have been adopted from ecological economics as well and have become part of the standard vernacular of 
the green economy. These include concepts such as ecological limits, natural capital, the global commons and global goods, 
ecosystem services, and a ‘strong’ notion of sustainability (Richardson 2013). According to Costanza and colleagues (2012), 
because other forms of capital and assets depend entirely on the natural world and natural capital, sustainability requires that 
humans live off of the ‘interest’ (sustainable yields) generated by natural capital without depleting the capital itself. This is the 
central concept characterising the ‘strong sustainability’ position within green economy debates. In contrast, a ‘weak 
sustainability’ position views both natural and human-made capitals as inherently substitutable (Costanza et al. 2012). 
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the global commons’ scenario in the early twenty-first century, in which individuals have 
enjoyed free exploitation of resources and environmental services, while the costs of this 
utilisation (externalities and resulting resource scarcities) are distributed among all current 
and future users. 
 
As Death (2014) argues, essential principles and academic debates among ecological and 
environmental economists have arguably changed little since the 1980s, but what has 
changed is the political and economic context of the debates in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century. A number of global economic and environmental policy trends since the 
1990s are associated with the global diffusion of environmental pricing and the increasing 
importance of private financing of conservation and sustainable development, and while at 
the same time converging crises, including the climate crisis in the global financial crisis, are 
crucial to understanding why the idea of the green economy has returned to prominence and 
become a key policy issue of the early twenty-first century. 
 
Both of these crises gave strength and urgency to the idea of the necessity of state 
intervention in the economy, and to the idea of the need for economic planning and targeted 
investments. Perceptions of these linked crises were, and continue to be, shaped by growing 
international anxiety and policy debate around global climate change, mitigation and 
adaptation throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century. In turn, due to the dual 
nature of the crises, interest in the green economy is motivated by two parallel, but 
seemingly disparate, primary concerns: while some see the green economy as a metaphor 
and means for building a more ecologically or socially sustainable future, others see it as an 
opportunity to expand markets and kick-start economic growth. As a result, some notions of 
the term ‘green economy’ sway one way or the other, while some, like the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) definition, discussed below, attempt a full reconciliation of 
the two positions (Death 2014: 5). 
 
The most authoritative, policy-oriented working definition for the green economy (and the 
main focus of this report) is associated with the UNEP’s Green Economy Initiative (GEI), 
launched in 2008, which holds that ‘a green economy is one that results in improved human 
wellbeing and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological 
scarcities’ (UNEP 2011a: 1). This conception of the green economy was heavily promoted 
(and, it is important to note, contested) in the lead-up to the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (UNCSD) (Rio+20) held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012 (Tienhaara 
2014). In the sense applied by the UNEP, the green economy is conceptually broad, socially 
inclusive, resource efficient and low carbon. Green economic growth is driven by a 
combination of public and private investments that enhance sustainability, and prevent loss 
of biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services. The trajectory of the green economy is 
oriented around preserving and rebuilding ‘natural capital as an economic asset and a 
source of public benefits’, especially for the poorest (UNEP 2011a: 1). According to the 
UNEP (2011a), the purposes of green economic development schemes include promotion of 
investment-driven economic growth, reduction or offset of carbon emissions and pollution, 
enhancement of energy and resource efficiency, preservation of biodiversity, and 
enhancement of ecosystem services (16). UNEP (2011) explains that, ‘[t]his development 
path should maintain, enhance and, where necessary, rebuild natural capital as a critical 
economic asset and source of public benefits, especially for poor people whose livelihoods 
and security depend strongly on nature’ (16). 
 
Following UN framings, the green economy is meant to serve primarily as a flexible policy 
toolkit that includes recommendations for command-and-control environmental regulations 
as well as market-based and financial instruments and voluntary initiatives to promote pro-
environment goods and services from which stakeholders on multiple levels can choose and 
then adapt to national and local particularities and needs (UNEMG 2011). Furthermore, 
green economy strategies target a broad variety of sectors and domains, including science 
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and technology, energy, transportation, industry and agriculture. Cumulatively, green 
economy reforms are intended to realise a global systemic transition towards sustainability in 
production, consumption and growth. A primary goal is to encourage investment in natural 
resource-efficient technology, renewable energy, and other means of low-emissions growth 
in order to counteract the negative environmental, economic and social consequences 
associated with the conventional global ‘brown’ economy in which growth is driven by 
intensive and unsustainable use of natural resources and petrochemicals. 
2.2  Roles and responsibilities in green economy policy 
transitions 
According to the United Nations Environment Management Group (UNEMG) (2011), three 
primary groups of stakeholders have key roles and responsibilities related to bringing about 
green economy transitions. These are: (1) members of the UN system and multilateral 
development banks, (2) private sector investors, and (3) the public sector, which includes 
national, sub-national and local governments. 
 
The role of the UN system and multilateral development banks is to provide technical advice 
and technical support to governments in the areas of policy and project design and 
implementation; carbon market development; guidance on the greening of value chains; 
providing assistance to help countries maximise investments in energy efficient and climate 
change mitigation and adaptation made by the private sector, and applying a range of 
instruments to support and fund the development of climate-smart agriculture and 
infrastructure. 
 
The role of the private sector in the green economy is primarily that of investor. Specific 
types of responsibilities include making investments in green ideas, technologies and 
programmes; creating innovative solutions that reduce emissions and resource use, and 
creating innovative solutions to generate economic growth and employment opportunities. 
 
In this scheme, the public sectors of particular countries carry the greatest burden of 
responsibility. Public sector roles and responsibilities include influencing the flow of private 
funding for programmes and establishing the appropriate investment context through public 
spending; triggering green economy policy transitions, including institutionalising sustainable 
consumption and production patterns; building the necessary professional and institutional 
capacity for the green economy transition; curtailing corruption through clear regulation; 
working with the private sector to identify impediments to green economy transitions, and to 
establish clear, stable and coherent policy and regulatory frameworks that facilitate the 
integration of social, environmental and governance issues into investment decision-making; 
ensuring that investment treaty practices encourage green investments without leading to 
‘green protectionism’; ensuring inter-ministerial collaboration to communicate the negative 
societal implications of under-pricing to all concerned parties, and designing and 
implementing new fiscal and tax policies in line with full-cost pricing2 policies on how to use 
generated revenue. 
 
Although not discussed in detail by the United Nations Environment Management Group 
(UNEMG), within this system, regional governing bodies and intergovernmental 
                                               
2 As part of the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA), full-cost pricing is an essential principle and tool of the 
green economy. Full-cost pricing calls for formally accounting for the full social and environmental costs – including the costs of 
managing, abstracting, and providing access to natural resources and environmental goods and services – of a national 
economy. Apart from reflecting social and environmental costs and prices through taxes, full-cost pricing also implies phasing 
out of environmentally harmful subsidies such as those on fossil fuels, fisheries, forestry, water use, land use and agriculture 
because they encourage carbon emissions, resource depletion and environmental degradation, and because they cause trade 
distortions and constrain public finance. According to the UNEMG, full-cost pricing is necessary because it contributes to a more 
level playing field between the established ‘brown’ technologies and newer green technologies (UNEMG 2011; UNSD 2014b). 
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organisations are also expected to play an important role ensuring the proliferation of green 
economy reforms among member states, including designing regional green economy 
strategies to link up with global initiatives such as the CDM and REDD+, and facilitating 
member countries’ participation in them. 
2.3  Green economy reforms and confronting climate change 
According to the UNEP, specific green economic development schemes should include 
promotion of investment-driven economic growth, reduction or offset of carbon omissions 
and pollution, enhancement of sustainable energy and resource efficiency, preservation of 
biodiversity, and enhancement of ecosystem services (UNEP 2011a). Along these lines, a 
green development trajectory should, ‘maintain, enhance and, where necessary, rebuild 
natural capital as a critical economic asset and source of public benefits, especially for poor 
people whose livelihood and security depend strongly on nature’ (UNEP 2011a: 1). In the 
context of climate change policies, specific activities and policies are often categorised as 
contributing to ‘adaptation’ or ‘mitigation’. Adaptation refers to ‘adjustment in natural or 
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities’ or increases social or ecological 
resilience (Parry 2007; SADC 2010; Smit and Wandel 2006). Such activities may be oriented 
around disaster risk reduction, or oriented around building social resilience in the face of 
anticipated climatic shocks. Mitigation activities, in which NRF-related activities are included, 
are defined as ‘intervention[s] to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse 
gases’, and include activities related to, for example, enhancing capacity for producing clean 
energy, developing market-based mechanisms to reduce deforestation or enhance forest 
stocks, enhancing carbon sequestration in agricultural and forestry sectors and increasing 
access to international markets for ecosystem services (SADC 2010; Smit and Wandel 
2006). 
2.4  Economic and policy trends implicated in the establishment 
of markets and mechanisms for environmental conservation 
products 
While the current dominant manifestation of the green economy approach coalesced in the 
wake of the 2008–09 crisis, the policy framings, accounting practices, mechanisms, 
partnerships and logics that drive it arose due in large part prior to that, in the context of the 
expansion and mainstreaming of sustainable development efforts in the 1990s. This occurred 
through a series of transformative policy debates that occurred alongside a series of 
multilateral environmental conferences that were convened (e.g. the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development; the General Assembly Special Session on the Environment 
(1997)), treaties produced (e.g. the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992); 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992); the Convention to Combat Desertification 
(1994); the Kyoto Protocol (1997)) and resolutions that were passed (e.g. the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development (1992); Agenda 21 (1992); Forest Principles (1992)) which 
cumulatively contributed to establishing the normative policy language, global infrastructure 
and mechanisms for globally integrated environmental and economic governance. These 
included the introduction and proliferation of a few key concepts and practices associated 
with NRF: national-level environmental-economic accounting, including ‘natural capital’ 
accounting, principles towards the establishment of international markets for new 
environmental products and services based on standard valuation and monetised measures 
of environmental health and degradation, and creating standards for banking and trading 
environmental products and services as financial securities. 
 
Understanding markets for trading in environmental goods and services can be complicated 
due to the bureaucratic structure of global NRF, the high number of markets and market-like 
mechanisms, due to the fact that trading can occur on both primary and secondary as well as 
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‘compliance’ and ‘voluntary’ markets, as a result of numerous shifts in patterns of trading 
over the years, and due to a lack of transparency and reporting consistency in the system. 
The establishment of international markets for financialized environmental conservation 
products has developed gradually since the early 1990s, with intellectual roots that go back 
farther. This development has been associated with policy trends and a series of economic 
shocks and crises related to high-yield investment ‘bubbles’ and busts that affected global 
financial markets throughout the 2000s. Boom-and-bust financial cycles resulted in a 
situation in which an array of private financial actors including investment banks and 
management companies were looking for new investment opportunities, and investments in 
developing countries and environmental securities seemed a promising solution. 
Concurrently, the establishment of markets for financialized environmental products has 
developed as a result of the interaction among concurrent and overlapping economic and 
environmental policy trends and framings (Leach, Scoones and Stirling 2010). These include: 
 
 Normalisation and mainstreaming of economistic environmental framings in global 
environmental policy 
 The increasing proportion of the global economy controlled by private finance, driven 
by international investment 
 The practice of leveraging public monies to attract private investment 
 The evolution of environmental pricing mechanisms, environmental-economic 
accounting and the creation of ecosystem-based conservation commodities 
 The establishment of multilateral commitments to emissions reduction targets 
 The establishment of international compliance markets and mechanisms for 
emissions offsets under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) 
 The establishment of voluntary markets for conservation products. 
 
Historically speaking, the establishment of markets for conservation products was dependent 
on the widespread adoption from the 1980s of increasingly economistic language, first as a 
metaphor among some academics and then spreading, in a more literal sense, to policy, to 
describe ecological processes and functions. The language of ‘ecosystem services’ began as 
a strategic effort to communicate, in a language that reflects ‘dominant political and 
economic views’, the significance of non-market ecosystems and biodiversity to humanity, 
and to encourage their conservation (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011: 614). The 
normalisation and mainstreaming of economistic environmental framings in global 
environmental policy has manifested in notable shifts towards the literal monetary valuation 
of natural resources through natural capital and ecosystem services accounting on the 
national level (discussed in the previous section) (Costanza et al. 1997; De Groot et al. 2012; 
UNSD 2014b). This is most evident in the outputs of the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (the Rio Earth Summit), including the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 
which proposed plans for establishing guidelines around integrated environmental-economic 
accounting, emissions allowances, and flexibility mechanisms for offsets trading, and the 
2005 Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, which frames the natural environment’s 
relationship to humans as a provider of goods and services (Corvalan, Hales and McMichael 
2005; Sullivan 2013; UNCED 1992). 
 
The estimated cost of the programme of work that was an outcome of the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit – a global systemic shift towards the goal of sustainable development – was 
extremely high. Wealthy parties were only willing to commit about US$125bn in public funds 
towards the US$625bn estimated cost of implementing, and subsequent commitments have 
not significantly reduced the funding gap (Newell 2013). Since the early 1990s, the 
proportion of the global economy represented by private finance has grown exponentially. As 
an illustrative example, in 1992, public financial flows were still greater than private financial 
flows worldwide, despite ‘successive waves of liberalisation in global finance’, yet by 1996 
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private flows were more than five times larger due to institutional and individual investors’ 
search for increasingly higher returns and diversification (Ganzi et al. 1998; Newell 2013: 
115). One attempted means of closing the gap has been to apply public monies to particular 
‘leverage points’ within the financial system to encourage private investment in a range of 
sustainable development arenas (Ganzi et al. 1998). 
2.5  Natural capital, integrated environmental-economic 
accounting and environmental pricing 
Costanza and colleagues (2012), writing from the disciplinary perspective of ecological 
economics, define natural capital as ‘the natural environment and its biodiversity, which, in 
combination with the other types of capital, provide ecosystem goods and services, which 
are the benefits that humans derive from ecosystems and are essential to basic needs such 
as survival, climate regulation, habitat for other species, water supply, food, fibre, fuel, 
recreation, cultural amenities, and the raw materials required for all economic production 
(Costanza et al. 2012: v–vi). In the context of sustainable development, natural capital is 
considered one of several overlapping types of capital/asset along with social, cultural, 
human and built capital assets that, in different combinations, produce goods, services and 
attributes that allow humans to survive and thrive. These productive natural assets are 
referred to as ‘capital’ in a broader sense than the traditional use of the term in the context of 
neoclassical economics. Here, natural capital indicates a stock or accumulation or heritage – 
received from past generations, and contributing to the welfare of the present and future 
generations – through particular biological and geophysical functions that regulate natural 
processes which are essential to human survival (Aylward and Barbier 1992; Pearce et al. 
1989). 
 
Appropriately valuing in situ natural capital and its functions in national accounting is the first 
step towards environmental pricing. Prior to widespread policy implementation, this was 
depicted in the environmental and ecological economics literatures variably as either a 
relatively straightforward process that required that ecology be translated into the language 
of market economics, or an extremely challenging process due to the complexity of tracking 
non-market ‘goods’ and ‘services’. For example, according to Aylward and Barbier (1992), 
valuing ecosystem functions is ‘…a matter of determining the connection between underlying 
ecosystem relationships and the overarching economic system’ (35). They continue that, 
since any natural or human-made system is characterised by three essential concepts: 
stocks, flows and the organisation of the stocks and flows, a starting point in valuation should 
be to identify parallel concepts in ecology (structural components, environmental functions 
and diversity) and economics (goods, services and attributes). Conversely, Repetto and 
Magrath (1988) discuss the fact that integrating natural resources into national income 
accounts by assigning values to resources and the services they provide, is especially 
difficult with resources that are not already ascribed market values (Repetto and Magrath 
1988).  
 
Natural capital and ecosystem services accounting, long advocated and methodologically 
debated by environmental and ecological economists, entered policy discussions in the early 
1990s as means to acknowledge and account for the role of the natural environment as an 
important asset of developing countries. A call to develop a programme of ‘integrated 
environmental and economic accounting’ in all countries featured prominently in Agenda 21, 
the voluntary treaty/action plan signed by 178 governments who were party to the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development, often called the Rio Earth Summit, in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil (UNCED 1992). 
 
Costanza and colleagues (2012) summarise a number of critiques and limitations of gross 
domestic product (GDP) as a wellbeing measure. These include the fact that GDP fails to 
account for both beneficial and harmful externalities; that activities that deplete natural 
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resource stocks are counted as ‘income’; failure to account for inequality; failure to account 
for changes to the natural resource base, and an overemphasis on flows and underemphasis 
on stocks (Costanza et al. 2012: 50). Integrated environmental and economic accounting 
was envisioned as a way to move beyond traditional goods and services in calculating GDP 
by addressing many of these issues through acknowledging and including the role of the 
natural environment as a source of natural capital assets and as a sink for harmful by-
products of industrial activity. 
 
After many years, several handbook iterations, and the creation of the Committee of Experts 
on Environmental-Economic Accounting in 2005, international guidelines for the System of 
Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA), the primary environmental ‘satellite’ 
programme of the System of National Accounts, was adopted by the United Nations 
Statistical Commission in 2012 and was undergoing revision as recently as 2014 (UNSD 
1993, 2003, 2009, 2014b). The 2012 SEEA comprehensive guidance consists of three 
documents: the Central Framework (UNSD 2014b), Experimental Ecosystem Accounting 
(UNSD 2014c), and Applications and Extensions (UNSD 2014a). Together, these documents 
respond to the call from Agenda 21 and seek to: (1) present a statistical framework designed 
so that users can easily link and compare environmental and economic variables, including a 
comprehensive set of tables and accounts to guide the compilation of statistics and 
indicators for policymaking, analysis and research; (2) define a measurement framework for 
integrating biophysical data, tracking changes in ecosystems and linking those changes to 
human behaviours and economic activities; (3) articulate procedures for assessing and 
calculating the market values (and changes in the values) of a variety of natural resource 
stocks, goods and services, and (4) demonstrate how this information can be used in 
decision-making, policy review and formulation, analysis and research. 
 
Challenges to environmental-economic accounting stem from lack of capacity and expertise 
needed for implementation, and from problems with measurement and definition. For 
example, ecology and economics have failed to standardise and operationalise the definition 
and the measurement of ecosystem services and across disciplines and sub-disciplines 
there exist multiple, competing meanings of the term. This is problematic for policymakers 
and professionals tasked with environmental accounting because environmental accounting 
systems increasingly are adopting ‘services’ as units they must track, measure and account 
for (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007: 616). Despite efforts to mainstream national-level 
environmental-economic accounting and develop broadly applicable guidelines, identifying 
reliable methodological approaches to modelling, valuing and accounting for natural capital, 
and the ecosystem services provided by it, have been challenging to economists, 
statisticians, policymakers and governments. This is due to a number of inherent challenges 
related to global inequalities in the capabilities of different countries to implement 
programmes, as well as to fundamental problems reducing or abstracting the properties and 
interactions of complex, diverse and dynamic systems to ‘manageable’ and measurable 
commodity units or conservation products commensurate with standard market principles 
and logics. This is related to the problem of determining the appropriate market values of in 
situ natural capital assets – things and relationships that do not have a long history of 
commoditisation and, by definition, only have economic value as productive capital as intact 
natural systems and components (UNSD 2014b). 
 
As advocated by the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEES) and the 
economics of ecosystems and biodiversity (TEEB), and as incorporated into national-level 
policies, systematically valuing in situ ecosystems and their functions in national accounting 
is one pathway towards environmental pricing. Pricing can and has occurred in a number of 
approaches to environmental mitigation that have been applied in various ways in both 
wealthy and lower-income countries – with non-financialized mechanisms such as monetised 
accounting, fines or taxation for net degraders/polluters and subsidies and payments for net 
conservers and stewards; with more financialized, yet regulated, mechanisms such as 
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carbon allowances and carbon, sulphur, water/watershed quality, marine resource or 
biodiversity offsets, or through fully financialized, unregulated mechanisms and financial 
instruments such as securities (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011; Kollmuss, Zink and 
Polycarp 2008; Sullivan 2009, 2012, 2014). 
2.6  International compliance and voluntary markets for 
environmental conservation products 
Compliance markets are regulated mechanisms to compel entities (governments, regions, or 
companies that are usually high net polluters) to reduce environmentally destructive activities 
through participation in mitigation activities to offset environmental harm. Compliance 
markets for environmental offsetting can be created and regulated by multilateral 
agreements, and through regional-, national-, and sub-national-level legislation to establish 
trading schemes for a variety of environmental mitigation products, including credits 
associated with GHG emissions regulation, biodiversity and habitat offsets, wetlands 
services, air pollution and water quality, for example. Such compliance programmes exist in 
the European Union (EU), Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, the USA, and in the state of 
California, and may or may not ‘link up’ with multilateral mechanisms. In fact, according to 
Doswald and colleagues, some of the oldest and most developed biodiversity offsetting 
schemes in the world are associated with the USA Clean Water Act of 1972 and Endangered 
Species Act of 1973 (Doswald et al. 2012). 
 
International emissions markets stem primarily from international efforts to regulate global 
carbon dioxide emissions in the UNFCCC, which adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 
(Corbera and Brown 2008). The Kyoto Protocol, which was ratified by 170 countries, set 
legally binding emissions reductions targets for 37 industrialised countries (exceptions 
include the USA and Australia) known as Annex 1 countries. In order to facilitate compliance 
with the treaty, the Kyoto Protocol established three ‘flexibility mechanisms’: Emissions 
Trading (ET), Joint Implementation (JI) and the CDM. ET established a cap-and-trade 
system of certified units for GHG emissions reduction. Under the mechanism, Annex 1 
parties receive an allotment of emissions allowances related to overall reduction targets. 
Countries may choose to reduce emissions to reach targets through internal adjustments in 
emissions or through trading units across international borders. The JI and the CDM are both 
‘project-based’ mechanisms, in which mitigation projects, which may or may not be based on 
ecosystem services, must go through a certification and verification process in order to 
count. The JI established a mechanism for mitigation relationships in which Annex 1 
countries can meet mitigation targets by generating credits from emissions-reducing or 
saving projects in other Annex 1 countries. The CDM is a mechanism that establishes similar 
mitigation relationships between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 (lower-income, less 
industrialised) countries. When projects are established and verified units can be ‘traded’, so-
called ‘compliance’ markets are created. 
 
Another compliance mechanism that has been under negotiation under the UNFCCC for 
several years is known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+). REDD+ is a set of guidelines to facilitate the development of national 
strategies for tropical forest management and forest-based mitigation activities in developing 
countries, an area that many parties to the Kyoto Protocol felt was not sufficiently addressed 
in the context of the CDM. At the moment, engaging in REDD+ is seen by developing 
countries with large forest endowments as a means to access international resources to 
improve the impacts of conservation projects and enhance local livelihoods (Ferguson 2009). 
REDD+ activities in participating countries are funded through a number of multilateral and 
bilateral agreements, and the majority of current financial flows associated with REDD+ are 
in the form of development aid to establish national-level programmes and sub-national 
projects. These are intended to feed into national-level REDD+ strategies. Once REDD+ 
negotiations are finalised on a global level, national programmes established, and reporting 
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and verification mechanisms tested, it is anticipated that funding will transition from aid into 
performance-based payments for forest-based emissions reductions in particular countries 
(Ecosystem Marketplace 2013). These payments are intended to be the result of REDD+ 
carbon units traded on both compliance and voluntary markets. 
 
Voluntary markets have developed separately from and function outside of compliance 
markets, and are unregulated markets for trading in carbon, biodiversity and ecosystem 
services commodities. Voluntary markets are meant to enable businesses, governments, or 
individuals to purchase credits created under the CDM or various voluntary schemes as 
investments or to offset their own emissions (Kollmuss et al. 2008). Conventional investment 
banks and management companies design new markets and market-like instruments for 
ecosystem services delivery and other ‘green’ securities investments. To do so, investment 
banks and international organisations encourage developing countries to accept loans for 
environmental mainstreaming – by integrating ecosystem services and green economy 
principles in all planning activities – and capacity building to be able to sustain, enhance and 
account for natural capital stocks. At the same time, at least in theory, investment banks and 
international organisations direct flows of financing from mutual funds, unit trusts and 
pension funds, the investment wings of property, casualty, and life insurance companies, 
venture capital firms and private foundations to investment opportunities in developing 
countries wishing to attract investors to finance major green transitions, and in particular the 
environmental mitigation activities that promise to usher in a new era of sustainable 
economic growth (Ganzi et al. 1998; Lohmann 2010). 
2.7  From sustainable development to the green economy vision 
Following a proliferation of publications, reports and heated debates during its lead-up, in the 
summer of 2012, the member states of the United Nations convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
for the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) (UNDESA 2011). The 
meeting was convened in the context of multiple overlapping crises, a questionable 
economic recovery, an immensely powerful global finance industry, unprecedented global 
social and economic inequalities, widespread disappointment with the performance of past 
sustainable development policies, conflicts over the meeting agenda and new ideas about 
expanding economic growth in the twenty-first century (Bina 2013). Like the Rio Earth 
Summit of 1992, the 2012 UNCSD, or ‘Rio+20’ as it has become known, represents an 
important moment in recent global environmental policy. This is not primarily due to the 
outputs of the meeting itself, which included a working paper titled The Future We Want and 
several resolutions around sustainable development commitments (UN 2012a, 2012b), but 
due to the opportunity that it represented for rebranding the multilateral environment-
development policy strategy of the past twenty years as the ‘green economy’, and enhancing 
the approach in a few key areas, including strengthening international governance and 
financing mechanisms, emphasising the role of capital allocation in avoiding crisis; 
strengthening global capacity for dissemination of knowledge and expertise, and for 
mainstreaming the approach in the UN’s work and partnerships among UN agencies and 
institutions and multilateral banks, bilateral aid agencies, NGOs, intergovernmental 
organisations, governments and private finance. If, as Brand (2012) notes, the vision of 
sustainable development articulated at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit represented ‘an attempt 
to reconcile environmental problems with those of development’ (Brand 2012: 28), then the 
vision of the green economy articulated in the lead-up and context of Rio+20 might be 
characterised as an attempt to reconcile problems of managing global environmental crisis 
with those of the global financial industry. 
 
Even though the framework of the green economy represents a shift in notions of sustainable 
development and the respective roles of the economy, ecosystems, and governance 
institutions in it, the particular elements making up the proposed green economy framework, 
or toolkit, are not new. In fact, they are, for the most part, policy artefacts of the sustainable 
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development approach of the 1990s and early 2000s and are associated with the promotion 
of clean energy, infrastructure and transportation; integrated environmental-economic 
accounting following SEEA and World Bank guidelines; leveraging (advocating the 
development of national-level regulatory frameworks to attract investment and reduce risk to 
private investors and markets); PES and other green market-based and financial instruments 
linked to conservation, forestry and agriculture (UNEP 2011b). The intensification of NRF 
promotion and planning in particular, as a key element of the UNEP green economy toolkit, is 
meant to simultaneously address the convergent economic and environmental crises of the 
early twenty-first century by correcting policy gaps, environmental management 
shortcomings and market failures. 
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3  The global green economy and regional 
economy strategies in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) 
3.1  Regional overview 
The SADC is a regional intergovernmental organisation formally established between ten 
Southern African states by treaty in 1992 (SADC 1993), and is broadly oriented around 
coordination among member states across broad economic and social sectors. The SADC is 
based in Gaborone, Botswana, and membership comprises fifteen countries that 
geographically span the Southern African continent and the Western Indian Ocean: Angola, 
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe (Mahembe and Odhiambo 2014; SADC 2012b). 
 
At its founding, the broad goals of the SADC included promoting integration and cooperation 
around political and economic governance; trans-border peace and security; self-sustaining 
development with complementarity between regional and national strategies and 
programmes; environmental sustainability and protection and working towards intra-regional 
solidarity (SADC 1993). Yet, some authors have noted that there seem to be two distinct, 
competing economic visions within the SADC: an inward-looking vision of the SADC as a 
‘regional fortress’ in which member states can seek development through privileged access 
to an enlarged market area that remains relatively isolated from external markets, and an 
outward-looking vision of the SADC as a platform for directly improving the competitiveness 
of individual member states in international markets and for improving consumption 
opportunities for citizens of different member states (Erasmus, Flatters and Kirk 2006; 
Flatters and Kirk 2003). 
 
This perception may in fact reflect the fact that SADC member states are incredibly diverse in 
terms of historical, political, ecological and economic trajectories, and in their relationships 
with one another, resulting in marked variation in development indicators, governance 
capabilities, infrastructure, per capita income and wealth, levels of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), state capacity, residents’ access to public services and trade dynamics (Mahembe and 
Odhiambo 2013). For example, simply in terms of GDP, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are all low-income 
economies within the SADC, while the economies of Lesotho, Zambia and Swaziland are 
classified as lower middle-income. Angola, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and 
South Africa are all considered higher middle-income economies (World Bank 2015). South 
Africa is a particularly powerful political and economic influence within the region, and in fact, 
one justification of the formation of the SADC was to dismantle regional dependencies on 
South Africa’s economy and international trade arrangements. Despite this, South Africa 
remains a very important regional influence ‘as a result of the size of its economy, power of 
its state and capital-state interactions’ (Carmody 2012). 
 
In addition to economic inequalities and dependencies, other areas of significant intra-
regional variability relate to endowments of natural capital assets, levels of direct 
dependency of the human population on natural resources for sustenance and survival, 
assessed levels of environmental degradation (e.g. levels of endemic biodiversity, 
deforestation, erosion, other forms of land cover change, and degree of national engagement 
on environmental issues (Naidoo, Davis and Van Garderen 2013). Despite a proliferation of 
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intra-regional reforms focusing on decentralisation, privatisation of services, and (to varying 
degrees) development-focused national-level comprehensive environmental programming 
through the 1990s and 2000s, much of the region has not been able to effectively ‘maximise 
the economic benefits from their forest resources’ with the exception of South Africa and 
Zimbabwe (SADC 2011). 
3.2  The SADC green economy approach 
According to Rochette and Billé (2012), the regionalisation of international environmental 
laws and norms is one of the most important legal trends in recent decades. This reflects the 
idea that many environmental problems of global significance require policy action at 
regional, national and local levels (Rochette and Billé 2012). Along these lines, even though 
the SADC region is a low net producer of greenhouse gas emissions, it has always 
maintained a policy commitment to sustainable development principles. According to the 
initial treaty that established the organisation, which was signed in the same year as the first 
Rio Earth Summit, a main strategic goal stated that, ‘policy measures will be taken and 
mechanisms instituted to protect the environment, and manage natural resource utilisation 
with a view to achieving optimum sustainable benefits for the present and future generations 
of Southern Africans’ (SADC 1993). Since the late 2000s and the lead-up to and following 
the Rio+20 summit in 2012, the SADC Secretariat has embraced the language of the green 
economy and has worked with consultants affiliated with, among others, the UNEP, World 
Bank and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) to design a 
what would come to be termed a regional green economy strategy, and to assess capacity 
for implementing particular finance-based climate change adaptation and mitigation 
measures across member countries. Yet, despite this, progress towards green growth policy 
transitions at the SADC level are not proceeding quickly and efforts remain fragmentary. In 
fact some authors attest that regional progress is ‘only now beginning’ (Nhamo and Nhamo 
2014: 59). 
 
The current SADC green economy regional approach is heavily oriented around energy 
efficiency and particularly resource financialization in the form of REDD/REDD+, carbon 
accounting and participation in international carbon markets, and mainstreaming of green 
growth principles across sectors has already begun. In recent years, the SADC has 
produced a variety of wide-reaching policy frameworks including the Regional Infrastructure 
Development Master Plan, the SADC Industrial Development Framework, and the draft 
Regional Agriculture Policy, each of which seek to ‘mainstream’ pro-environment green 
growth principles in different ways. For example, the Regional Infrastructure Master Plan 
emphasises a technology-based ‘greening’ of the energy sectors of member states, as well 
as strengthening governance and infrastructure to support transfrontier conservation areas 
(SADC 2012c). The SADC Industrial Development Framework highlights the importance of 
low-emissions industrial development and the low-carbon clean technology (SADC 2012a). 
Among all three of these policy documents, the SADC Regional Agricultural Policy (2013a) 
includes the most emphasis on green growth strategies, including carbon and biodiversity-
oriented NRF (e.g. carbon stock analysis applied to international trading to benefit 
agricultural and forestry sectors). 
  
The Southern Africa Sub-Regional Framework of Climate Change Programmes, a 
stocktaking and gap analysis report produced in 2010, includes the goals of expanding PA 
networks throughout the region, of creating market-based mechanisms for forest 
preservation under REDD and REDD+, establishing protocols for carbon and greenhouse 
gas accounting, and of strengthening of institutions and the building of capacity to gain 
access to the available financial mechanisms under CDM and other financiers. These goals 
were framed as a regionally coordinated approach to supporting global mitigation efforts (as 
well as financing sources for proposed adaptation and mitigation actions), preserving nature 
and reducing poverty (SADC 2010). As of 2010, even though region-level scoping activities 
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were well underway, only the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Zambia had 
projects linked up with the UN-REDD programme, although there was a reported interest in 
related activities from most member countries across the region (SADC 2010). By 2013, 
regionally coordinated REDD+ pilot projects were being designed for the Baikea Woodlands 
in Botswana, the Miombo Woodlands in Malawi, and the Mopane Woodlands in Mozambique 
(Naidoo et al. 2013; SADC 2013b). 
 
Even though the regional SADC strategy is overwhelmingly carbon-centric in terms of 
financialization goals, it is important to note that other types of types of green economy-
aligned financialization programmes and projects do exist or are under consideration on 
national or sub-national levels in different member countries. These include biodiversity 
offsetting, PES schemes built around biodiversity, water and bundles of services, and 
Ecosystem-based Approaches (EbA) that involve linkages to global financial markets (Anglo 
Platinum 2009; Devisscher 2010; King 2014; Ruhweza and Waage 2007). 
3.3  Policy framings and challenges to coordinating policy 
reforms on an intra-regional level 
On the regional level of the SADC, ‘big picture’ framings of green economy reforms tend to 
follow the pattern of global environmental and development organisations, emphasising 
benefits from future financialization programmes and sustainability potentials, opportunities 
for member states to capitalise on plentiful natural resources and to finance national 
development programmes and preserve natural ecosystems, and promises for local 
programmes to enhance livelihoods and increase resilience in the face of climatic change. 
 
However, in closer detail there are notable and important differences in framing as well, 
including a lack of emphasis on broad abstract concepts such as scarcity and markets as 
adopted from environmental economics in global green economy discourse, and a focus on 
sub-regional, rather than global, impacts of climatic and landscape change, and repeated 
assertions of the relative culpability of the global North and global South in relation to 
environmental degradation that contrasts greatly with UN framings. These assertions 
highlight the fact that the SADC region contributes very low levels of energy-related GHG 
emissions, resulting in a ‘negligible’ contribution towards global climate change, yet SADC 
member states ‘are among the most vulnerable to trans-boundary effects of global climate 
change’ (Barnard 2014: 26). 
 
For example, the UNEMG (2011) states that, ‘[t]he context of the development of this [green 
economy] approach is an acknowledgment that the resource intensity of production and 
consumption activities in developed and developing countries exacerbates resource 
constraints and threatens to break planetary boundaries’, implying evenly shared culpability 
for environmental degradation and shared responsibility for mediation and corrective action 
(UNEMG 2011). Contrary to this framing, the 2011 SADC Support Programme on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), which proposed a ‘blueprint’ 
for sub-regional capacity building towards implementation of reforms across sectors, 
contrasted its position on REDD and REDD+ to that of industrialised regions that are net 
polluters and ‘tend to emphasise emission reduction commitments from all parties,’ while 
framing developing countries’ perception of REDD as ‘an opportunity to seek funding for 
adaptation, sustainable forest management and poverty reduction; with emission reductions 
being a useful outcome and a global good’ (SADC 2011: 5). Reports produced by the SADC 
Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (CNGO) in 2011 and 2012 further locate the 
underlying drivers of global climate change as ‘the result of economic growth and 
consumption and production patterns, historically from the global North’ (SADC-CNGO 2011, 
2012). 
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Another key difference in policy framings relates to the visibility of discussion of potential 
constraints to green economy implementation in policy documents. Pre- and post-2012 
SADC policy documents dedicate a substantial amount of space to discussing practical 
realities and constraints to sub-regional integration around environmental mainstreaming 
(systemically incorporating green economy principles throughout existing institutions, 
directives and policies) among member states, including both long-standing and emerging 
challenges to coordinating uptake across different member countries and sectors. According 
to the SADC Secretariat, long-standing constraints facing regional coordination and 
implementation of sustainable development programmes are linked to the existence of too 
many development programmes operating in the region, leading to technocratic gridlock; 
pervasive institutional weaknesses and poor capacity for transitions on regional and sub-
regional levels; lack of access to financial, technical and human resources; over-dependence 
of the region and member states on international donor funding, ongoing intra-regional 
dependency on South Africa, and institutional ‘misalignment’ across countries. These long-
standing circumstances intersect with new and emerging challenges, including the 
overlapping crises of 2008–09; persistent poverty, HIV/AIDS, and gender inequity, and failed 
attempts to create employment, entrepreneurship and trade opportunities (SADC 2010, 
2011, 2013b). Completion of the 2010 scoping study for sub-regional climate change 
programmes faced several limitations that may relate to such long-standing and more recent 
constraints, including the fact that the authors of the study received limited feedback from 
national governments on the questionnaire that they circulated and had inadequate 
opportunities for interaction with national actors since there were no country visits. They were 
further limited by ‘the multi-disciplinary nature of climate change and variability, as well as 
disjointed sector-based interventions’, which made it difficult to identify and target specific 
government departments or programmes dealing with adaptation and mitigation actions 
(SADC 2010: 25). 
3.4  Uptake of green economy reforms among select SADC 
member states 
Regional-level policy reforms are a continuing project on the level of the SADC. In recent 
years, the SADC has produced a variety of wide-reaching policy frameworks for guiding 
sustainable development of infrastructure, industry and agricultural policy that have proven 
and remain difficult to implement across the region (Sikuka 2014). The forthcoming regional 
Green Growth Strategy and Action Plan (Vision 2050) will likely face similar difficulties in 
implementation. According to the UNEP (2014), countries seeking to make green economy 
policy reforms are often faced with significant challenges and barriers, including ‘extreme 
poverty, growing inequity, degradation of ecosystems, and vulnerability to climate change’ 
(UNEP 2014: 1). Regional inequalities discussed in the previous sections extend to the 
capabilities of different SADC member countries to establish new programmes linking 
existing environmental programmes, industry and energy sectors to international green 
economy initiatives, partnerships and mechanisms. This is due to a number of factors that 
variably limit or enhance member countries’ willingness or capabilities to commit to new 
programmes or carry out environmental mainstreaming (Nhamo and Nhamo 2014). 
 
For example, according to the SADC Secretariat, one sub-regional trend that proved a 
limitation to regional coordination related to the fact that many ‘national policies, programmes 
and projects on agriculture do not mainstream the need for proper land use management for 
purposes of enhancing carbon sequestration. There is therefore a gap in the agriculture 
policies, programmes and projects of these countries’ (SADC 2010). Yet, at the same time, 
some countries within the region, specifically Mauritius and South Africa, are well ahead in 
terms of green growth policy transitions (Nhamo and Nhamo 2014). 
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In order to paint a more complete picture of the relative uptake of financialization-oriented 
green economy policies across the region, this section explores how governments of select 
SADC member states – Madagascar, Tanzania and South Africa – and their partners have 
interpreted and translated international and regional-level policies and recommendations into 
national-level environmental and development planning. 
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4  Green economy and green growth policy 
transitions in Madagascar 
4.1  Country overview 
Madagascar, located in the Southern Africa and Western Indian Ocean region, is the fourth 
largest island in the world with a land area of 581,540 square kilometres and a population of 
just over 23 million. Madagascar is one of the poorest countries in the world, and also one of 
the world’s ‘hottest hotspots’ for biodiversity; over 90 per cent of the island’s plants and 
animals are endemic to the island (Ganzhorn et al. 2001). The majority of the Malagasy 
population live in rural areas, and 80 per cent of the adults make a living through agriculture, 
fishing and forestry. These sectors account for over one quarter of Madagascar’s GDP (CIA 
2014). A long period of political crisis began in early 2009, which dealt additional blows to the 
struggling economy as the government was put under aid sanctions and revenue from 
tourism, another key national industry, fell by over half. 
 
Madagascar was the last major land mass on Earth to be permanently settled by humans, 
and is a country of significant cultural and ecological diversity. Its economic and demographic 
history are associated with its location in the Western Indian Ocean along historic Indian 
Ocean trade routes, and contemporary Malagasy culture, language, and genes reflect 
African, Arab, Indian, Indonesian, East Asian, European and American influences (Beaujard 
2005; Dewar and Wright 1993; Southall 1971). Madagascar was an independent kingdom 
prior to colonisation by France in 1898. After gaining independence from France in 1960, 
Madagascar passed through four political phases, or ‘republics’, each characterised by 
distinct constitutions, internal political processes, and relationships with other countries and 
regions.  
 
In the 1980s, Madagascar’s economic performance was internationally perceived as a 
severe crisis, and a new period of liberalisation was ushered in as foreign investment in 
resources and industry was once again encouraged and structural adjustment programmes 
were put in place (Horning 2006). With the presidential election in 1992, Madagascar entered 
the phase of the Third Republic. This period is characterised by further state decentralisation 
and new partnerships with networks of NGOs, private companies, bilateral donors, and 
multilateral financial institutions (Duffy 2006). These shifts have been accompanied by 
increased policy attention to issues of democratisation, economic liberalisation, and national 
economic development, and an emphasis on the necessity of the interdependence of 
development goals and environmental preservation (USAID 2010). 
 
It was during the period between the early 1990s and mid- to late-2000s that what some 
authors have termed the ‘conservation boom’ took hold in Madagascar with the 
establishment of a three-phase National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) (Duffy 2005; 
Marcus and Kull 1999; Mercier 2009). In the early 2000s, former president Marc 
Ravalomanana articulated the ‘Durban Vision’ to triple the size of Madagascar’s network of 
protected areas, or convert 10 per cent of Madagascar’s surface area to formal conservation 
protection. As of 2014, about 5 per cent of Madagascar’s total land area is under varying 
degrees of formal protection (World Bank 2015). 
 
Conservation activities in Madagascar are hotly contested among different groups of 
stakeholders, not the least due to the negative effects that Madagascar’s conservation 
policies have had for rural livelihoods, and problems related to inclusivity, equity, and social 
justice remain key challenges to the sustainability of environmental policy in Madagascar 
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(Ferguson 2009; Huff 2011, 2012, 2014; Scales 2014). According to Scales (2014), the 
central challenge for conservation policy in Madagascar relates to the question of ‘how to 
protect the island’s remarkable biological diversity at the same time as improving the 
livelihoods of the millions of people directly dependent on its ecosystems for their 
livelihoods?’ (Scales 2014: 5). 
4.2  National green economy transitions 
In Madagascar, national policy and sub-national programmes have a long history of attention 
to issues of biodiversity conservation, reducing deforestation, restoring forest cover and 
experimentation with a variety of different environmental policy frameworks and management 
schemes from ‘fortress’ conservation to community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM) to PES (Randimby and Razafintsalama 2006). Sustainable development and 
environmental protection have arguably been among the most important national policy 
issues in Madagascar for the past twenty-five years, and have been linked to state 
restructuring, streams of multilateral and bilateral aid for both environmental and social 
programming, to the activities of private companies and foundations and to efforts around 
establishing a revenue-generating international ecotourism industry. In fact a great deal of 
effort during the second and third phases of the NEAP was and is being put to establishing 
conditions, practices and infrastructure for mainstreaming sustainable development and 
natural resource management principles at the national and sub-national levels through 
policy reforms, encouraging or mandating improved local environmental practices, 
environmental management schemes and promoting environmental education (Mercier 
2009). 
 
Because of this, even though Madagascar has not developed a formal green economy 
strategy, Madagascar offers a fertile policy space for the uptake of green economy/green 
growth reforms and the country has passed several important pieces of national legislation 
along these lines in relation to climate change adaptation and mitigation, agriculture and 
coastal development. These included the launch of the three-phase NEAP in 1991, the 2010 
Policy for the Sustainable Development of Coastal and Marine Areas, and the expansive 
2011 National Policy to Combat the Effects of Climate Change (PNLCC), which established a 
number of adaptation- and mitigation-oriented instruments and protocols, including the 
framework for developing a National Action Plan of Adaptation (NAPA) and a list of 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA), a national strategy for obtaining approval 
for carbon projects under the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol. This established parameters for 
assessment of national GHG emissions, and established thirty new climate monitoring 
stations in the most vulnerable areas of Madagascar (Rakotondrosoa and Ratovo 2014; 
Razafindralambo and Gaylord 2006). 
 
National reforms and transitions that pertain to NRF have been organised around a few key 
activities, which build upon existing conservation policy infrastructure, the national PA 
network, international institutional and organisational networks (including partnerships with 
environmental NGOs and membership in formal green economy platforms and forums), and 
public–private partnerships (PPPs). The majority of the projects carried out under these 
platforms are not overseen directly by the state or public agencies in Madagascar. Rather, 
they are carried out through cooperative partnerships and co-funding arrangements among 
many actors and groups. In addition to agencies and organisations affiliated with the United 
Nations and the World Bank, projects are carried out with input from national- and sub-
national-level quasi-government agencies; government ministries; international 
environmental NGOs and private non-profit foundations (the most prominent in Madagascar 
being the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Conservation International (CI) and the Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS), but many smaller organisations and foundations support action 
in Madagascar); private companies and bilateral aid agencies. Through binding partnerships 
and funding commitments with these platforms and forums, including the national and sub-
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national institutional changes required to facilitate programmes and projects, green economy 
principles become part of the policy landscape of the country. 
 
These key activities and initiatives include: 
 
 The ongoing development of a national REDD+ strategy 
 The ongoing development of a national SEEA 
 Adaptation to climate change through coastal zone management and ecological 
restoration 
 The generation of project-based carbon credits through linkages to the CDM 
 A position of strong protection of natural ecosystems, habitats and biodiversity 
mainstreamed into other policy areas 
 Establishing a public policy environment conducive to private and corporate 
investment in NRF-oriented conservation projects around carbon, biodiversity, and 
‘bundled’ ecosystem services. 
 
For the past several years, a major policy priority has been the development of a national 
REDD+ strategy with technical and funding assistance from the Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) and, more recently, through knowledge sharing from the UN-REDD 
programme (FCPF 2014; Vahanen 2010; Vahanen et al. 2009). Madagascar is among        
36 countries selected to participate in the World Bank’s FCPF Readiness programme, one of 
two programmes – the Readiness Fund and the Carbon Fund – administered by the FCPF to 
assist developing countries in developing national-level REDD+ activities by assigning 
economic value to standing forests (FCPF 2014, 2015; Naidoo et al. 2013). As of 2014, 
Madagascar’s REDD Technical Committee (CT-REDD) of the Ministry of Environment, 
Ecology and Forests had completed its Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP). The R-PP is 
described by the FCPF as the country’s national ‘roadmap for REDD+ readiness’, which 
includes stages and procedures for two years of work towards finalising the national REDD+ 
strategy (FCPF 2014). Madagascar also receives non-financial support from the UN-REDD 
programme, a partnership between FAO, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the UNEP that supports the national REDD+ strategy processes (UN-REDD 
2015; Vahanen 2010; Vahanen et al. 2009). 
 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) of the UNEP and the World Bank have supported and 
continue to support a number of programmes and projects in Madagascar around the issues 
of climate change, land and forest degradation, and biodiversity which are at various stages 
of planning, assessment and implementation (GEF 2015). Programmes for climate-smart 
agriculture in the drought-prone southwest region of the country and adaptive coastal zone 
management are being developed to achieve resilience in the face of climatic changes. 
Climate-smart agriculture and coastal management planning, which includes habitat 
restoration and livelihoods improvement projects, is primarily supported through the Least 
Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF) of the GEF (Biagini et al. 
2012; GEF 2012). The AF is financed through the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol (UNDESA 
2013). 
 
The ongoing development of a national SEEA is being carried out with assistance from the 
World Bank-led Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) 
Programme (WAVES 2012a, 2012b, 2014, 2015b). Also, several climate change mitigation-
oriented projects in Madagascar are approved under the CDM. These include Sahanivotry 
Hydro Power Plant, a solar cooker promotion project, and many forest and conservation 
carbon projects (Springate-Baginski and Wollenberg 2010). 
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4.3  Case study – Biodiversity offsetting and ilmenite mining in 
south-eastern Madagascar 
This case study focuses on biodiversity offsetting and related processes and activities by Rio 
Tinto/QMM intending to offset environmental damage caused by extensive mineral sands 
mining activities in Mandena near the town of Fort Dauphin (also called Tolagnaro) located 
on the south-eastern tip of Madagascar. This case highlights the implications of the 
‘emerging nexus’ of multinational extractive activities, biodiversity conservation and NRF in 
the context of international green economy transitions (Seagle 2013). This case also 
demonstrates how multiple dimensions of NRF (e.g. environmental accounting, carbon 
sequestration, biodiversity offsetting, PES) can be incorporated into a single offsetting 
scheme that can enhance potential for local conflict in circumstances of persistent social and 
economic inequality. 
 
At the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) World Conservation 
Congress in Bangkok in 2004, representatives of the multinational mining company Rio Tinto 
announced that it ‘aims to have a net positive impact [NPI] on biodiversity by minimising the 
negative impacts of its activities and by making appropriate contributions to conservation in 
the regions in which it operates’ (Turner 2014). This is the central idea behind Rio Tinto’s 
subsequent global ‘no net loss’/’net positive impact’, or NPI, approach, in which the company 
applies a number of tools and methods, including spatial strategies of voluntary biodiversity 
offsetting bundled with carbon and ecosystem services accounting and trading, with PES as 
a compensatory finance mechanism, to fund conservation activities outside of active mining 
zones (Rio Tinto 2008; Anstee 2008; WBCSD 2015). 
 
This strategy, which has been previously piloted once in the context of the Dampier Salt 
operations in Western Australia and once in the context of copper mining Mongolia, links 
place-based extractive and conservation activities to both international voluntary markets and 
a variety of international voluntary and compliance-based finance mechanisms and market-
like instruments, which vary depending on the national policy contexts of particular mining 
projects (Turner 2014). While the Rio Tinto/QMM Madagascar project is described by 
company literature as a third ‘pilot project’ for the NPI approach, the company has 
experience outside the NPI with environmental impact mitigation activities in diverse 
contexts, from conservation banking in the USA to linkage with the national REDD+ strategy 
in Guinea (Anstee 2008; Rio Tinto 2014). Madagascar does not formally require that 
companies establish biodiversity offsetting programmes to compensate for environmentally 
destructive industrial activities, but it does have policies in place that encourage companies 
to establish voluntary environmental safeguards, including biodiversity offsetting schemes 
(Ekstrom and Rabenantoandro 2013). 
 
Rio Tinto is a UK-based British–Australian multinational mining company, and is one of the 
largest mining companies in the world. Their ilmenite project, which extracts a titanium 
dioxide ore that is exported and refined into a white pigment used to colour consumer goods 
from paint to toothpaste, is the largest development project in Madagascar (Rio Tinto 2015). 
Extensive titanium exploration in the region was carried out by Rio Tinto throughout the 
1980s, followed by an environmental and social impact assessment that was completed in 
2001. Rio Tinto/QMM was legally established in 2005, when the Malagasy government 
agreed to contribute US$35m to the development of infrastructure for a large-scale ilmenite 
mining enterprise in south-eastern Madagascar. This funding came from a World Bank 
‘Integrated Growth Poles’ project aimed at strengthening finance, export capacity and private 
sector development. In this particular case, the contribution was earmarked to fund the 
renovation of the Ehoala Port and urban infrastructure of Fort Dauphin to facilitate QMM’s 
mining activities in three sites in the region (Seagle 2013). Rio Tinto/QMM is jointly owned by 
Madagascar’s l'Office des Mines Nationales et des Industries Stratégiques (OMNIS), which 
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controls 20 per cent of the company, and a French subsidiary of Rio Tinto, which controls   
80 per cent of the company (Rio Tinto 2015). 
 
The Rio Tinto/QMM project began in 2005 with infrastructure development, and the purchase 
and relocation of local Malagasy residents from approximately 6,000 hectares of territory. 
The project involves three primary sites in south-eastern Madagascar – Mandena, Ste Luce 
and Petriky – to be mined sequentially under a long-term land lease (between sixty and one 
hundred years) from the Malagasy government (Gerety 2009; Rio Tinto 2014; Seagle 2009, 
2012, 2013). These mining sites include about 6.5 per cent of Madagascar’s remaining 
littoral (coastal) forests, which sit atop ilmenite deposits, in one of the most ecologically 
diverse areas of the country. Active dredge mining of ilmenite involves destruction of 
substantial amounts of littoral forest in this context. In accordance with the NPI strategy, Rio 
Tinto/QMM worked to legally establish five small PAs within the mining area perimeter that 
would, through the application of Rio Tinto’s NPI strategy, serve to offset the biodiversity 
losses associated with dredge mining sites (Ekstrom and Rabenantoandro 2013; Temple     
et al. 2012; Turner 2014). 
 
Active extraction at the first site, Mandena, began in 2009, and mine managers contend that, 
at peak capacity, it could produce as much as two million tonnes of ilmenite (worth about 
US$100 per tonne for unrefined ore) per year to be exported for processing abroad (Seagle 
2013). Of the full 6,000-hectare project concession, the Mandena portion of the project 
comprised approximately 2,000 hectares, and 230 hectares of this were set aside for the 
Mandena biodiversity conservation area, which is advertised as a ‘biodiversity gene bank’ for 
future restoration activities in the area and is promoted by QMM as a destination for 
ecotourism (Seagle 2009). 
 
In addition to the support of the World Bank and the partnership between Rio Tinto and the 
Malagasy government, a number of international environmental and development 
organisations support Rio Tinto’s NPI approach in Madagascar. The IUCN entered a formal 
partnership with Rio Tinto in 2010 after nearly ten years of less formal cooperation. Other 
corporate partners include organisations such as Bird Life International, the WCS, 
Conservation International (CI), Kew Botanical Gardens and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). Rio Tinto’s partner organisations praise the company’s 
scientific approach to biodiversity offsetting and portray the company as an ethical, ‘model’ 
mining company which goes above and beyond legal requirements for addressing social and 
environmental issues (Seagle 2009: 15). 
 
Rio Tinto is also a member of a number of initiatives that work to actively ‘green’ the global 
extractives industry, including the Global Mining Initiative (GMI) and the Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP). The IUCN is arguably one of the company’s most 
important partners in terms of its environmental image and activities. They, along with the 
GMI and BBOP, have been instrumental in assisting Rio Tinto in linking to green economy 
initiatives and developing and branding the NPI approach (WBCSD 2015). 
 
According to Rio Tinto, the NPI approach, as the company’s comprehensive mitigation 
strategy, will ensure ‘that our actions have positive effects on biodiversity features and their 
values that are accepted to outweigh the inevitable negative effects of the physical 
disturbances and impacts associated with mining and mineral processing’ (Anstee 2008). In 
practice, NPI entails a number of activities to realise a situation in which environmental 
impacts on biodiversity are formally offset. These are summarised by various authors in 
terms of the following: 
 
 Establish and manage ‘avoidance zones’ within mining concessions (Rio Tinto 2014). 
 Select metrics for assessing impacts and offsetting activities (Ekstrom and 
Rabenantoandro 2013). 
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 Identify ecological ‘baseline’ from which to measure habitat losses and gains over the 
course of the project (Temple et al. 2012). 
 Quantify residual losses once the ‘mitigation hierarchy’ has been followed, and ‘gains’ 
generated through offsetting (Ekstrom and Rabenantoandro 2013). 
 
In the case of the QMM project, avoidance zones are the legally established protected areas 
within the QMM lease/concession in south-eastern Madagascar (Rio Tinto 2014). 
Management of these zones involves a number of research, accounting and mitigation 
activities meant to preserve biodiversity above a ‘baseline’ level. The baseline for the QMM 
project was selected on the basis of modelling different environmental scenarios and 
selecting the one that appeared the most realistic. The selected scenario was based on a 
model that assumed no mining and an annual deforestation rate of 0.9 per cent per year due 
primarily to the livelihoods practices of local Malagasy communities who were forest users 
(Temple et al. 2012). In this context, the projections of losses and gains are based on 
additional scenario modelling and quantification of losses and gains against the baseline 
scenario are carried out periodically through scientific activities such as remote sensing and 
species-focused biodiversity inventories. 
 
The QMM project’s NPI biodiversity offset programme is directly and indirectly linked to 
green economy processes through partnerships and both voluntary and compliance markets 
for finance-based environmental products. The forested avoidance zones are speculated to 
become part of Madagascar’s system of environmental accounting (SEA) and the national 
REDD+ programme under approval of the CDM, to generate carbon credits for sale on 
compliance markets. The revenues generated by these sales would fund both the project-
based biodiversity offsetting programme and proposed payments for ecosystem services as 
a compensatory finance mechanism for local communities negatively impacted by the project 
(Anstee 2008; Rio Tinto 2008; Seagle 2013; WBCSD 2015). Hypothetically, biodiversity 
credits produced above the NPI threshold could be traded on voluntary markets to generate 
further revenue for the project. 
 
The QMM project has long been fraught with controversy. On one hand, the NPI biodiversity 
offsetting process is considered by a number of international environmental groups to be 
something of an environmental shell game, an attempt to ‘greenwash’ inherently ‘brown’ 
industrial activities and land grabbing. In addition, substantial conflicts have occurred 
between mining personnel and members of local communities that have been affected by the 
project. These conflicts are associated with dam construction, land dispossession, lost 
access to littoral forest resources, forced resettlement, enforced conservation, removal of 
tombs, and decimation of wetland plant species, which entailed various economic and social 
impacts on people living near the mines and avoidance areas. Affected populations are often 
the poorest of the poor and most dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods, and 
compensation for resources lost is widely considered unfair in the local area and is far below 
World Bank regulations (Seagle 2013). Protests have occurred around the QMM project 
since mining activities began in 2009, with hundreds of Malagasy people from around the 
region striking against loss of littoral forest, involuntary relocation, unfair compensation for 
lost lands and livelihoods, the destruction of sacred forests and ancestral tombs, and widely 
perceived unfairness in QMM’s practice of importing mine workers from other countries and 
regions rather than training and hiring local people to work on projects. A particularly large 
protest occurred in January of 2013, in which hundreds of lightly armed protestors who had 
experienced eviction from lands now controlled by the mines blocked roads and trapped 
employees (including the chief of Malagasy operations) in a mining site. After the company 
threatened to withdraw from all operations in Madagascar, the protest was put down through 
government military force (Seagle 2013). Some members of affected local populations, with 
assistance from international advocacy groups, took QMM to court over the issue of 
inequitable compensation for land, but the case was dismissed in 2013 (The Telegraph 
2013). These ongoing conflicts and controversies have resulted in a partial scaling-back of 
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QMM’s project activities and plans for expansion of mining activities past the first site have 
been shelved. 
 
This case highlights important relationships and processes around the sub-national 
implementation and unfolding of sustainable development and green economy/green growth 
policies, including the relative roles of states, private sector actors, NGOs and local 
populations in facilitating green growth schemes, and specifically how NRF and offsetting 
can buttress relationships between these diverse groups of actors in low-income settings. 
This case additionally underscores the ways in which NRF, in practice, can blur distinctions 
between environmental stewardship and environmental degradation; voluntary and 
compliance market domains; and social inclusion and exclusion, in particular project 
contexts. 
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5  Green economy and green growth policy 
transitions in Tanzania  
5.1  Country overview 
The United Republic of Tanzania was established following the end of British colonial rule in 
1964 with the political merger of the political territories of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Tanzania 
is one of the largest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and is located on the eastern coast of 
the Southern African mainland, and shares national borders with Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia 
(Kideghesho 2008). Like Madagascar, Tanzania is ranked as one of the poorest countries in 
the world and an estimated 36 per cent of its nearly forty million residents live in poverty (CIA 
2014). This is despite significant national economic growth in recent years due to extractive 
industry and tourism. About one quarter of Tanzania’s GDP comes from the agricultural 
sector. 
 
In the context of contemporary economic growth, some authors have noted a widening 
development gap between urban and rural contexts in Tanzania in recent years, in which 
urban areas such as the capital city Dar es Salaam benefit from national infrastructure 
projects meant to attract FDI, yet many rural areas are ‘left behind’ and growth is not felt ‘on 
the ground’ (Makene 2007: 32). Additionally, as in many Southern African countries, the 
issue of ‘land grabs’ have become a prominent issue in Tanzania as large-scale land leases 
to foreign investors are driven by dynamic political-economic forces related to the triple crises 
of the late 2000s and new opportunities for market expansion around biofuels, land 
speculation, extractives, tourism, hunting and carbon forestry (Nelson, Sulle and Lekaita 
2012). Tanzania is geologically rich, has one of the highest levels of biodiversity and 
charismatic wildlife in sub-Saharan Africa, and is home to some of the oldest fossil and 
archaeological evidence from human prehistory ever discovered (Delson et al. 2000). 
 
Prior to European colonisation, booming population centres in coastal areas became 
established in relation to important trans-continental trade networks. In the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries, respectively, Portuguese and later Arab political expansion into the 
region increased its economic significance, particularly to the Indian Ocean trade in enslaved 
people. 
 
By the 1880s, German colonisation was underway in the interior, and Germany maintained 
colonial control of the area as part of German East Africa until the end of the First World War 
(Nelson, Nshala and Rodgers 2007). The first large-scale land and environmental policies 
were passed in the region under German rule. These included the first hunting laws 1891 
and comprehensive wildlife regulations, (Wildschutzverordnung) in 1896, the year after the 
Imperial crown ordinance (Kronlandverordnung) granted the colonial government exclusive 
rights of occupation to all ‘ownerless land’ in the colony (Wanitzek and Sippel 1998). These 
two sets of rules set the stage for environmental policy trends involving increased legal 
transformation, through subsequent policies, of wildlife and their habitats from natural 
resources owned by different groups under customary law to a centrally-governed set of 
resources with highly controlled access through legal protected areas and hunting reserves 
(Wanitzek and Sippel 1998). 
 
This trend continued as Britain took over colonial governance of Tanganyika Territory after 
the First World War, passing major game ordinances and carrying out the re-gazettement of 
protected areas and reserves, excluding a number of human activities and resettling people 
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involuntarily from protected areas. These increasingly strict protection policies spawned 
resistance among populations affected, and generated a number of decades-long conflicts 
between local populations and wildlife/conservation authorities that lasted long after the end 
of the colonial period in 1964 (Brockington 2002; Homewood and Rodgers 1991; Nelson and 
Makko 2003; Nelson et al. 2007; Neumann 1992; Wanitzek and Sippel 1998). 
 
In the 1980s, Tanzania undertook a series of transformative legal and policy reforms. 
International concern over poor economic performance led to recommendations for reforms 
in line with economic liberalisation and political decentralisation. At the same time, 
conservation began moving away from a ‘fortress’ conception of environmental protection 
towards community-based and sustainable development approaches that gained traction 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Nelson et al. 2007). Community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) models typically (and ideally) rely on a ‘bottom-up’, rather than a 
‘top-down’, approach to managing resources and determining development priorities, and the 
paradigm is widely promoted as a corrective to the restrictive and exclusionary environmental 
policies of the past (Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003). Strong donor and NGO support led 
to the establishment of Tanzania’s formal Wildlife Policy in 1998, which ushered in a new 
policy movement in Tanzanian resource management. The Wildlife Policy, while still 
displaying Tanzania’s traditional wildlife-centric approach, further adopted the language of 
sustainability, biodiversity, stakeholder inclusion, benefits sharing and community control, 
and resulted in the proliferation of community-based pilot projects around a newly created 
category of protected area, the Wildlife Management Area (WMA) (United Republic of 
Tanzania 1998). 
 
While Tanzania was able to initiate policy transitions that involved the mainstreaming of 
sustainable development principles under Agenda 21 and UN guidance in the 1990s, the 
reform process around decentralisation and devolution of resource management was fraught 
with tension and inconsistency, and ultimately little substantive progress was ever made in 
systematically decentralising resource control or devolving authority over natural resources in 
WMAs to local people (Nelson et al. 2007). Brockington (2008) suggests that the 
unsatisfactory performance of decentralisation schemes lies in the fact that, even with 
appropriate policy structures in place, decentralisation is rarely accomplished in full because 
it is resisted by central governments that either refuse to devolve ‘real’ power, or devolve it to 
the wrong authorities (Brockington 2008). Other authors attribute dissatisfactory performance 
of community-based policy trends in Tanzania to the high costs borne by local communities 
without equitable access to benefits. According to Kideghesho (2008: 2), ‘despite the 
economic importance of wildlife nationally, the local communities have barely derived 
benefits sufficient enough to offset the wildlife-induced costs. This has greatly diminished 
incentives for local people to support conservation efforts’. 
 
Despite the historically demonstrated conflict potential of strict wildlife protection policies, 
Tanzania has an enduring policy commitment to preserving wildlife and natural landscapes, 
in large part due to the fact that its wildlife and ecotourism industry contributes approximately 
40 per cent of the country’s earnings from foreign sources through hunting concessions, 
trophy licenses, export of live animals and from non-consumptive tourism conducted in game 
parks and reserves (Kideghesho 2008). The tendency to strict protectionism is at 
loggerheads with a number of relatively recent policy trends in Tanzania which have, in 
principle, sought to hand more authority to local-level people for environmental protection 
and management. 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, as a result of the historical legacy of centralised resource 
management, institutionalised interest in maintaining firm government control over resources 
and tensions and antagonisms created by policy-practice gaps and inequitable projects, an 
emerging trend has been an increasing re-consolidation or re-centralisation control and 
power over the value of wildlife and natural resources in the country, which has implications 
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for understanding green growth transitions and conflicts (Benjaminsen et al. 2011; Nelson    
et al. 2007). 
5.2  National green economy transitions 
In Tanzania, national policy and sub-national projects and programmes have a long history of 
focusing on wildlife, particularly charismatic fauna, and habitat preservation through the 
creation of human-free or minimal-disturbance parks and reserves. As discussed in the 
previous section, control of access to wildlife has been a persistent and contentious policy 
issue since the German colonial period. In sustainable development policy literature, 
Tanzania is frequently cast as a model example of a low-income country that has 
successfully mainstreamed sustainable development principles through a stream of donor-
funded, yet nationally driven, poverty reduction and sustainable development policies (Death 
2013). Nord and colleagues, writing on behalf of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
called Tanzania ‘one of the leading reformers in Africa’ towards long-term sustainable growth 
(Nord et al. 2009: 7). 
 
However, some scholars have questioned the extent to which these new environmental 
policies, including Tanzania’s 1994 NEAP, the 1995 National Conservation Strategy for 
Sustainable Development (NCSSD), the 1997 National Environmental Policy (NEP) and the 
2004 Environmental Management Act No. 20 (EMA), were actually nationally led (Elliott-
Teague 2011; Grosen and Coskun 2010; Mwalyosi and Sosovele 1999; Wijen et al. 2012). 
These environmental reforms were developed in a context of structural adjustment, 
economic liberalisation, privatisation of the public sector and construction of natural 
resources as the epicentre of extractive sector reforms meant to attract foreign investment 
(Grosen and Coskun 2010). 
 
Even though Tanzania does not have a formal green economy strategy, the country has long 
been a popular location for donor-led policy ‘testing’, particularly around environmental policy 
approaches and initiatives, and has, with technical assistance from donors, begun to position 
itself as a leading participant in NRF-oriented green growth schemes (Nord et al. 2009). 
These have been organised around key activities that build on the existing conservation and 
forestry policy and PA infrastructure of the country, draw on national and international 
institutional and organisational networks (including partnerships with NGOs, community-
based organisations (CBOs), membership in international green economy and green growth 
platforms and forums), and PPPs. As in Madagascar, these activities tend to be carried out 
through cooperation and co-funding arrangements with diverse actors at international, 
regional and sub-national levels. Green economy principles are incorporated, though not 
elaborated upon in great detail, in Tanzania’s national five-year development plan and are 
embodied in particular initiatives, agreements and strategy documents (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2012b; Benson and Greenfield 2012). Key areas of activity include: 
 
 Ongoing development of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania 
(SAGCOT) initiative 
 Ongoing effort to develop a national REDD+ strategy, including a national-level 
REDD mechanism and incentives scheme (e.g. PES and payments for watershed 
services (PWS)) 
 Ongoing effort to develop a national REDD+ strategy, including a national-level 
REDD mechanism, forest monitoring system and incentives scheme 
 Developing capacity for transition to renewable energy and energy efficiency (RE/EE) 
in housing and industry with linkages to the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol 
 The ongoing development of a national SEEA. 
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A great deal of effort has gone into producing a ‘greenprint’ for a sub-national green growth 
initiative known as SAGCOT. In 2010, Tanzania launched the SAGCOT initiative as a public–
private partnership dedicated to ensuring food security, reducing poverty and spurring 
economic development in Tanzania’s Southern Corridor (Milder, Buck, Hart, Scherr and 
Shames 2013; Milder, Buck, Hart, Shames et al. 2013; Milder, Hart and Buck 2013; Scherr  
et al. 2013; Shames, Scherr and Friedman 2013). Initiated at the World Economic Forum 
Africa summit in 2010, the SAGCOT initiative had, as of 2012, leveraged public–private 
sector and multi-donor catalytic investment of over US$2bn from founding partners including 
Unilever, USAID, the Government of Tanzania, the Tanzania Sugarcane Growers 
Association and the Confederation of Tanzanian Industries, and still hoped to attract an 
additional US$1bn (Scherr et al. 2013). According to Benson and Greenfield (2012), ‘[b]y 
addressing the entire agricultural value chain, the SAGCOT approach will go beyond raising 
agricultural productivity and ensure the necessary infrastructure, policy environment and 
access to knowledge to create an efficient, well-functioning agricultural value chain’. The 
SAGCOT initiative applies an ‘Agriculture Green Growth’ (AGG) framework, and is heavily 
engaged with a variety of NRF strategies to generate revenue streams and incentivise 
conservation activities. As outlined in the AGG, the SAGCOT initiative’s authors hope ‘to 
market the enabling environment for… innovative investments’ from four types of investor in 
particular: sustainable agriculture investment funds; climate change mitigation funds; debt 
finance with ‘green’ screening criteria; and companies investing in agriculture that 
incorporate environmental and social values in their business models (Milder et al. 2013: 58). 
 
The UN-REDD programme, the World Bank’s FCPF, and the CDM (through the UNEP-
CD4CDM scheme) have supported the ongoing effort to develop a national REDD+ strategy 
by funding and advising work to develop the policy infrastructure and demonstration/pilot 
projects. Tanzania’s national strategy has focused on establishing capacity for a national-
level REDD mechanism and incentives scheme (e.g. PES and payments for watershed 
services [PWS]), based on the principles of Participatory Forest Management (PFM) and 
incorporating pro-REDD+ forestry activities. Supporting these goals has been the 
development of the National Forest Monitoring Assessment (NAFORMA) programme to fill 
forestry and REDD+ Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) requirements (United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2010, 2014). The European Union Global Climate Change Alliance 
supports a number of climate change adaptation and mitigation activities and projects in 
Tanzania with linkages to the national REDD strategy and the CDM. These focus on 
agroforestry, water scarcity, cook stoves and solar energy (GCCA 2015; UNDESA 2013). 
 
NRF is an important part of green growth-oriented energy reforms in Tanzania. For example, 
under the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme (REEEP), a joint UNEP/EU 
low-emissions capacity building programme, Tanzania has received co-funding from 
SouthSouthNorth, Gold Standard, the UNDP Goal Carbon Facility and Irish Aid to integrate 
RE/EE and carbon finance capacity, as well as to receive certification of projects from the 
results-based Gold Standard CDM carbon certification scheme (REEEP 2015). Tanzania has 
also received support from the World Bank’s Energy Sector Assistance Programme 
(ESMAP) to support resource mapping for renewable energy and establish project-based 
linkages to the CDM (UNDESA 2013). Tanzania is a pilot country in the Programme for 
Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Low-income Countries (SREP) under the Strategic Climate 
Fund, with co-funding from the private finance community, including commercial debt and 
equity investors (Ishengoma 2013). 
 
Through funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), 
Tanzania is one of eight countries participating in a programme called Ecosystem Service 
Accounting for Development (ESAforD), which is a collaboration between the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), the seven Environment for Development 
(EfD) Centres in China, Chile, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania, and 
the WAVES partnership. The objectives of the experimental programme include 
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mainstreaming environmental-economic principles in national policy, and establishing 
standards and protocols for national environmental-economic accounting systems (Oyuke 
2013; WAVES 2015a). 
 
Tanzania is additionally the site of a number of project-based initiatives funded by the GEF, 
the UNDP Poverty Environment Initiative, the Global RE/EE Fund, and other organisations 
and initiatives focusing on biodiversity conservation, climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, sustainable land management, conservation agriculture, watersheds, forestry 
and wetlands valuation (UNDESA 2013; Klarer 2011). 
5.3  Case study – The intersection of community-based forest 
management (CBFM) and emerging REDD+ policy in 
Tanzania 
This case study focuses on conflict potentials at the intersection of decentralised CBFM and 
emerging REDD+ policy in the context of the Suledo Forest Reserve in Tanzania. 
Suledo Forest Reserve is a community-owned and managed Village Land Forest Reserve 
(VLFR) located in Kiteto District, Arusha Region. It is jointly owned by nine villages and 
covers an area of over 160,000 hectares in an area of Miombo Forest in the drylands of the 
Maasai Steppe, an area that has been home to Maasai pastoralists for centuries (Arts et al. 
2012; Sjoholm and Luono 2002). Activity around CBFM in Suledo began in 1993, when 
villagers learned that the Arusha regional government planned to establish a central 
government forest reserve at Suledo. Establishment of the central government reserve was 
meant to combat logging and deforestation and would have contributed to fulfilling the terms 
of the 1989 Tropical Forestry Action Plan, but would also have made grazing livestock, an 
important part of Maasai livelihoods, illegal overnight (Benjaminsen et al. 2011; Sjoholm and 
Luono 2002). 
 
In response, residents of Suledo villages with assistance from the Swedish Land 
Management Programme (LAMP), funded through the Swedish International Development 
Corporation Agency (SIDA), formed forest management committees, mapped the forest, 
created use zones, bylaws and a patrolling system (Sjoholm and Luono 2002). After much 
work and lobbying by the community, the district government agreed to allow CBFM. 
Between 1994 and 2007, more and more villages became involved and LAMP continued to 
assist in land use surveys, plans, creating village bylaws, and demarcation of forest zones 
and borders (Arts et al. 2012). The official Suledo Management Plan has been in place since 
2000, and in 2007, after several years of successful, low-cost forest management by 
villagers and after winning the UNDP US$30,000 Equator Prize in 2002 for PFM, Suledo was 
formally gazetted as a VLFR in 2007 (Arts et al. 2012). 
 
A type of PFM created under the Forest Act of 2002, VLFRs are the most common form of 
CBFM in Tanzania (Blomley and Iddi 2009). For a VLFR to be established, a village or group 
of villages must have legal land tenure over the forested area in question, and must complete 
a number of tasks to document forest boundaries and describe a comprehensive 
management plan (Blomley and Iddi 2009). Villages must describe and map the forest 
boundaries; develop a management plan detailing how it will be used, managed and 
protected; elect a Village Forest Management Committee or Natural Resources Committee 
as a sub-committee of the village council and prepare bylaws that detail procedures for 
levying sanctions and collecting fines and fees. A district council must ratify all plans, and 
after three years of effective management, communities may apply for formal gazettement 
(Blomley and Iddi 2009). A community zonal management committee made up of 
representatives from Village Natural Resource Committees (VNRCs) oversees management 
of the VLFR and works with other stakeholders on management and forest harvesting 
agreements (Sjoholm and Luono 2002). In the case of Suledo, stakeholders include the 
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Suledo Community, the Prime Minister’s Office of Regional Administration and the Local 
Government (PMORALG), the Forestry and Beekeeping Division of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources (FBD) and Tourism, NGOs, forest research institutions, donors and others (Arts 
et al. 2012). 
 
The management plan for the VLFR establishes rules for use of the forest. These rules 
include a schedule of access to different zones for firewood collection and foraging activities, 
and specifies fees for permits to carry out specific harvesting activities. At the time of formal 
gazettement, Suledo villagers were promised that they would be able to benefit directly from 
commercial timber harvesting and the sale of charcoal, which would make a substantial 
contribution to local livelihoods (Benjaminsen et al. 2011; Veit, Vhugen and Miner 2012). 
 
At the time that the Suledo VLFR was created, it was not known that the area included 
particularly high-value timber resources (Mustalahti and Lund 2009). Blomley and 
Ramadhani (2006) estimate that potential revenue from sustainable timber harvesting at 
Suledo to be about US$140,000 per year, which would mean about US$15,000 of income 
per village per year. Annual revenue from selling charcoal made from the remnants of 
harvested timber was estimated at approximately US$30,000 per year for the nine villages 
(Benjaminsen et al. 2011). 
 
In 2008–09, plans for the first commercial timber harvest were underway. A pilot plot was 
identified, an inventory made and the FBD had given the community a special hammer for 
marking trees for harvest. All legal steps were followed and a tender and selection process 
for a harvesting contractor was carried out in 2009, with a contract signed that same year 
(Benjaminsen et al. 2011). However, plans were slow to progress due to unsatisfactory 
progress by the harvesting company. At the same time, disagreements were emerging 
among stakeholders, and what Humphries describes as instances of administrative ‘foot-
dragging’ in resistance to devolution and efforts at re-centralisation (Humphries 2012: 143). 
For example, the district government questioned agreed-upon distribution of roles and 
benefits from timber harvesting and the FBD decided that profits from charcoal sales should 
be split between the central government and the district council, contrary to the expectations 
of villagers (Benjaminsen et al. 2011: 12). In these examples, authorities attempt to exercise 
authority over the sale of and distribution of benefits from forest products from the Suledo 
VLFR, ‘despite having no legal right to do so, as legislation stipulates that this is controlled by 
the management plan for the VLFR and overseen by the VNRC at the village level’ 
(Humphries 2012: 144). These circumstances reflect the fact that those who are responsible 
for disseminating and implementing central policy at the local and district levels are often 
unwilling to divest power from themselves to villagers (Blomley and Ramadhani 2006). 
 
Additionally during this time frame, Tanzania’s legacy of PFM projects have come to be 
increasingly considered a strong foundation for developing a national REDD+ programme 
(TFCG 2009). National REDD+ policy acknowledges the capabilities of local users (including 
specific mention of the success of the villages of the Suledo VLFR) to successfully carry out 
forest management and restoration (United Republic of Tanzania 2012a). In terms of 
sustainable forest management, the Suledo VLFR has been extremely successful in that it 
has led to increased forest cover, increased species richness, and increased availability of 
commercially viable timber species, all at a very low cost because of the benefits that 
accrued (and were promised) to local villagers (Arts et al. 2012). Such management 
successes are attributed to legal ownership of forests by communities, transparent 
cooperation among stakeholders, and a lack of major problems with corruption (Arts et al. 
2012). 
 
However, as Bejaminsen (2011) points out, the ‘negative attitude’ towards the local use of 
forests has already made its way into national-level REDD+ policy as well, and livestock 
grazing, firewood collecting, charcoal production and timber extraction are listed among the 
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primary drivers of forest loss in Tanzania (Benjaminsen et al. 2011; United Republic of 
Tanzania 2012a). The Suledo VLFR is listed in policy documents as a high-value potential 
REDD+ site, yet is at the same time depicted as being at a moderate to high risk of 
degradation due to local charcoal production (Katoomba Group 2009). This contradictory 
policy position regarding community management of forests is a manifestation of the fact that 
there is a stark difference between the idea of managing a forest to maintain it as ‘standing 
carbon’ under the national REDD+ strategy, and managing a forest for multiple and flexible 
purposes based on the needs and priorities of local communities in negotiation with other 
stakeholders (Benjaminsen et al. 2011). Furthermore, because of the abstract nature of 
forest carbon, communities who legally own and manage forests do not automatically have 
carbon rights. 
 
As community-owned forests become the increasing focus of state re-centralisation under 
REDD+, CBFM and community incentives for conservation will be undermined because 
opportunity costs of forest management will increase for local communities, while benefits 
are siphoned off by central authorities (Veit et al. 2012). As Tanzania Forest Conservation 
Group (TFCG) suggests, in order for PFM to be an effective and equitable tool in the context 
of REDD+ implementation, the carbon rights of communities will need to be written into an 
international agreement and be a required component of national REDD+ strategies. Carbon 
rights should be linked to land tenure, and benefits to communities from national REDD+ 
carbon sales should be equitably negotiated, and should exceed the costs of forest 
management (TFCG 2009). Otherwise, ‘political dimensions of forest tenure and policy 
create a paradox for REDD: increasing the value of forest resources through global carbon 
markets without attending to local governance and rights will create political incentives 
towards centralised governance, which could lead to greater forest loss and lower forest-
related benefits for the poor’ (Sandbrook et al. 2010: 330). 
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6  Green economy and green growth 
transitions in South Africa 
6.1  Country overview 
The Republic of South Africa, located on the southern tip of the African continent, shares 
borders with Botswana, Lesotho (which is located fully within the borders of South Africa), 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, and its coasts stretch from the Atlantic to 
the Western Indian Ocean (CIA 2014). After Nigeria, South Africa has the second largest 
economy in Africa based on GDP, and is considered an upper-middle-income emerging 
market economy. In 2013, it had a GDP of US$350.6bn, yet approximately 45.5 per cent of 
its 52 million residents had incomes falling below the national poverty line (World Bank 
2015). South Africa has a large urban–rural development gap and its levels of economic 
inequality, poverty and unemployment are among the highest in the world (CIA 2014; World 
Bank 2015). The country’s infrastructure base is well developed, and South Africa is the 
primary dominant intra-regional member of the SADC (SADC 1993; World Bank 2015). 
 
Despite its relatively small size of 1,219,912 km2, South Africa is incredibly ecologically 
diverse, with ten described biomes, or eco-regions, that range from hyper-arid desert to 
savannah to tropical forest to tropical alpine, and the third-highest rate of biodiversity in the 
world (Carruthers 2006; Wynberg 2002). Today, South Africa contains over 400 public and 
private protected areas, including national parks, special reserves, transfrontier protected 
areas, and more. At the same time, the country faces a number of long-term environmental 
challenges, including chronic water shortages, industrial pollution, desertification and erosion 
(CIA 2009). South Africa is also the highest emitter of GHGs in Africa due to mining, 
manufacturing and other industrial activities (World Bank 2015). 
 
South Africa has a contentious and, at times, volatile, sociopolitical history from pre-colonial 
times to the present, with an ethnic landscape that has been created through the circulation 
and conflict among people from all over the world but most particularly between white settler 
populations and black South Africans (Carruthers 2006). While a detailed discussion of 
South African history is beyond the scope of this report, understanding the context in which 
green economy reforms are unfolding in South Africa requires some understanding of 
historical relationships between colonial and post-colonial racial policies, land policy 
trajectories, and conservation priorities. As Khan states, ‘[h]istorical and political factors such 
as the impact of the colonising process, the dispossession of blacks, the effect of racial 
attitudes, discriminatory legislation and the imposition of the Apartheid system in 1948, have 
had a significant impact on the development of environmental attitudes’ (Khan 1994: 499). 
 
The first European colonisers of South Africa were Dutch, who settled in the Eastern Cape in 
the late 1600s and founded the Cape Colony under commission from the Dutch East India 
Trading Company. From the outset, social relations between the geographically expanding 
Dutch-descended settlers (Boers, the Dutch and Afrikaans word for ‘farmer’) and indigenous 
residents of the territory were antagonistic, to say the least. Boer rule of the colony continued 
until the late 1700s, when a tug-of-war over colonial territorial control began with the British 
Crown. Over the course of the nineteenth century, conflicts among the Boers, the British, and 
indigenous groups continued, and were fuelled by violence perpetrated against indigenous 
groups, competition for control of agricultural and rangeland, and of newly discovered 
extractive resources including gold and diamonds. Eventually, the British gained control of 
the colony following the end of the Anglo-Boer War. 
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Conflict between white and black residents of the colony were further exacerbated by new 
pro-white policies of British administrators, and which were resisted by numerous South 
African social movements led by persons of colour, including black South Africans, Indians, 
and persons of colour of mixed heritage. Even though South Africa gained independence 
from the British Crown in 1934, the policy of white minority rule continued until the mid-
1990s. Apartheid, a policy in place in South Africa from 1948 until 1994, is arguably the most 
well-known of the country’s segregationist policies, but a long legacy of political conflict in 
South Africa is linked directly to efforts of successive colonial administrations to 
systematically deprive black and other communities of colour of land, resources and social 
rights (CIA 2014; Ross 2008; SAHO 2015). 
 
South Africa’s legacy of segregationist land policies resulted in systematically distorted 
patterns of land allocation, access to markets, provision of infrastructure and access to 
agricultural extension services. This began with early policies that established reserves for 
black residents of the colony that were intentionally too small to support independent 
agricultural livelihoods. According to Binswanger and Deninger (1993), an economic goal of 
these early policies was to reduce white settlers’ agricultural market competition from black 
farmers, and tenant farming became an increasingly common practice. Policies like the Glen 
Grey Act of 1894 and the Nature Lands Acts of 1913 and 1936 further squeezed black 
farmers by restricting land ownership on reserves to one parcel of no more than three 
hectares, restricting farms owned by black farmers to reserves, and prohibiting both 
sharecropping and land rental. In addition to eliminating agricultural competition, these later 
policies were oriented around weakening black farming syndicates and developing a labour 
force for mining by transforming farmers into wage workers through land exclusion 
(Binswanger and Deininger 1993). 
 
Over this time period as well, environmental protection programmes were being established. 
As Cock and Fig (2000) discuss, the historical development of protected areas reflects South 
Africa’s historical relations of power and privilege, and the establishment of parks and game 
reserves entailed a ‘double exclusion’ for black South Africans under colonialism and later 
apartheid – exclusion from residential, livelihood-related and recreational ‘consumption’ of 
protected territories and also political exclusion from decision-making about the creation of 
parks (Cock 2014). Prior to the end of apartheid, the National Parks Board (NPB), 
established in 1926, was completely made up of white males who were politically aligned 
with Afrikaner nationalism with administrators appointed by a highly centralised government. 
The board, like the central government, lacked transparency and democratic oversight 
(Rossouw and Wiseman 2004). Like Tanzania, early environmental preservation efforts in 
South Africa were game and wildlife-focused, and likewise, historically South African PA 
establishment has involved policies of removals of indigenous peoples and establishing 
restrictions on hunting and resource use within protected areas (Carruthers 1995; Venter     
et al. 2008). Throughout most of the twentieth century, parks, dedicated exclusively to 
biodiversity (and sometimes government military training) to the detriment of human needs, 
continued to reflect the worst aspects of ‘colonial conservation’ (Cock and Fig 2000). 
 
The early to mid-1990s brought the official end of apartheid, movement towards state 
decentralisation and, following international paradigmatic shifts towards sustainable 
development and participatory resource management, big changes for conservation policy in 
South Africa. The post-apartheid government inherited 17 public national parks with about     
4 per cent of the country’s land area dedicated to formal environmental preservation, 
changed the name of the NPB to South African National Parks (SANP) and asserted 
commitments to increased transparency, racial and political diversity, democracy and the 
equitable distribution of the benefits of environmental conservation in policymaking (Cock 
and Fig 2000). 
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Since the transition, South African national and provincial conservation agencies have also 
advocated for the expansion of the conservation agenda and of the territorial scope of 
protected areas in the country (King 2007; Rossouw and Wiseman 2004). In the mid-1990s, 
the SANP announced a new vision of conservation linked to sustainable conservation and 
development – preserving biodiversity across the biomes, fulfilling human needs, increasing 
human development, increasing employment, maintaining sustainable resource access and 
promoting community-based conservation (Cock and Fig 2000). Since 1995, South Africa 
has ratified the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and has spent more than US$20m on 
land purchases to expand the national PA network to cover 8 per cent of terrestrial land and 
20 per cent of coastal lands (GEF 2008). 
6.2  National green economy transitions 
Compared to the other two SADC countries discussed in this report, South Africa was well 
ahead of the global triple crisis and Rio+20 in relation to energy and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation policies, and in terms of movement towards multi-sectoral green 
growth transitions. These early policy actions following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit paved the 
way for later development of cross-sectoral strategies around green growth and the 
development of NRF (Wynberg 2002). For example, South Africa’s first national 
environmental policy process, the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) of 1998, 
was developed as an overarching framework for the establishment of key laws around 
environmental management and sustainable development (GEF 2008; Rossouw and 
Wiseman 2004). After signing on to the UNFCCC in 1993 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, 
the country prepared its Initial National Communication (INC) document, detailing areas of 
particular vulnerability to climate change and identifying options for adaptation and mitigation 
activities (Holgate 2007; Republic of South Africa 2003). The National Climate Change 
Response Strategy followed in 2004. In terms of renewable energy and energy efficiency 
(RE/EE), South Africa prepared a sustainable energy policy platform early on as well, 
including the White Paper on the Energy Policy of South Africa in 1998, the White Paper on 
Renewable Energy in 2003 and the Energy Efficiency Strategy in 2005 (GEF 2008). These 
are in addition to signing onto a number of international environmental conventions and 
producing complementary national platforms around industrial pollution, waste management, 
sustainable tourism, green employment, air quality, water quality, land and wetlands 
degradation, sustainable agriculture and forestry. 
 
Rather than scrambling to put together proposals for the international funding opportunities 
that emerged around Rio+20, South Africa’s transition from sustainable development to 
green growth around the UNCSD can be considered a matter of international branding 
(assisted by the UNEP’s GEI and other partners) through national-level planning and policy 
action. By strategically positioning itself as responsive to global crises, as ‘outward-looking’, 
and by investing in ‘green’ development projects in other countries, South Africa come to be 
widely considered a global green economy leader (Death 2014; UNEP 2013). 
 
Cumulatively, the prior frameworks, platforms and partnerships formed the foundation on 
which South Africa’s national green economy strategy, heavily oriented around the concept 
of ‘green growth’, was built (Death 2014; UNDESA 2013). More recent legislation and 
position papers specifically articulate with the green economy paradigm, including the short-, 
medium- and long-term strategic frameworks, the 2010 Green Paper on Climate Change, the 
2011 National Climate Change Response White Paper, the 2012 National Development 
Plan, and becoming a signer on the Copenhagen Accord. 
 
South Africa’s formal national green economy strategy focuses on nine key areas of policy 
action towards the goal of comprehensive green growth (DEA 2015). These nine key areas 
include greening buildings and the built environment; sustainable transportation and 
infrastructure, including the promotion on non-motorised transport; natural resource 
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conservation and management; sustainable waste management; agriculture, food production 
and forestry; water management; sustainable consumption and production methods targeting 
specific industries, and general mainstreaming of environmental sustainability, including 
greening large public events and tourism, and developing research and knowledge 
management skills capacity (DEA 2015). 
 
In addition to this policy branding, a few circumstances particular to South Africa’s 
environmental policy landscape make it stand out from other SADC countries, and have 
contributed to the development of a national strategy and the proliferation of green growth 
policies, programmes and projects on the national and sub-national level. 
 
First, in response to the global financial crisis, in 2008 South Africa launched a US$7.5bn 
economic stimulus package covering the period 2009–11, 11 per cent of which was 
dedicated to environmental themes and greening to ‘prime’ green economy transitions 
(Death 2014; Musyoki 2012; UNEP 2009). 
 
Second, South Africa established the Green Fund in 2012. The Green Fund is a national 
fund meant to support the development of South Africa’s green economy vision through 
leveraging public funds that remove market barriers to external investment (Green Fund 
2014). 
 
Third, and related, NRF, facilitated through linkages to voluntary markets for finance-based 
environmental products, PES, the CDM, and REDD+, is a major aspect of green growth 
planning in South Africa and crosscuts key green economy themes, sectors and policy 
instruments. South Africa has a very large portfolio of active CDM projects across sectors. 
Particular NRF effort is related to sustainable infrastructure (particularly capacity for RE/EE), 
biodiversity conservation and management in the context of an expanded network of 
protected areas, agriculture and forestry (Death 2014; Musvoto et al. 2015; UNEP 2013). 
Many of these initiatives have been facilitated through the Green Fund with co-funding from 
donors and private partnerships, including the Farming the Wild project to promote greening 
of the rural economy through conservation agriculture; biodiversity programmes like 
Sanparks and Shepherding Back; eThekwini Municipality’s Greening Durban programme that 
seeks to transform landfills into active carbon sequestration zones through reforestation; the 
Wildlands Waste-preneurs project that combines recycling and ecosystem services delivery, 
and the RE/EE retrofitting of low-cost housing. 
 
Fourth, and finally, and under the post-apartheid constitution, provincial legislatures were 
empowered to enact environmental legislation independently of the national government 
(King 2007; Rossouw and Wiseman 2004). This has resulted in not just a national green 
economy strategy, but also emerging provincial green economy strategies with their own 
particular focal areas (see, for example, Musyoki 2012; Western Cape Government 2013). 
6.3  Case study – Collaborative relations, conflict and the 
legitimating role of payments for environmental/ecosystem 
services (PES) in policy around the Maloti-Drakensberg 
Transfrontier Conservation Area in South Africa and 
Lesotho 
This case study focuses on transnational dynamics and conflict around planning for the 
Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area (MDTFCA), a 
collaborative trans-boundary PA that is operated jointly between the Republic of South Africa 
and the Kingdom of Lesotho. Transfrontier Conservation and Development Areas (TFCAs) 
are ambitious projects, crossing national borders and subsuming multiple land uses and 
tenure systems. They generally claim to achieve multiple benefits including biodiversity 
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preservation, cross-border alignment of land tenure systems, local economic development 
through skills training, new sources of income through involvement in conservation activities, 
and new ‘business opportunities’ for private corporations and local communities (e.g. through 
ecotourism) (Wittmayer and Büscher 2010; Büscher 2010). In addition, transfrontier 
protected areas like the MDTFCA are frequently promoted as ‘peace parks’, marketed 
internationally to donors as promoting international peace and cooperation. 
 
The MDTFCA is one of the most bureaucratically complex and most well invested TFCAs in 
the world (Büscher 2010). It spans jurisdictional levels – international, national, 
provincial/district, and local (Büscher 2012). It encompasses over 8,000 square kilometres 
that straddle the border between the two countries, joins several existing protected areas 
under a number of different governance schemes (Golden Gate Highlands National 
Park, QwaQwa National Park, Sterkfontein Dam Nature Reserve, uKhahlamba Drakensberg 
Park, Royal Natal National Park and Sehlabathebe National Park), and includes land 
spanning Botha-Bothe, Mokhotlong and Quacha’s Nek districts in Lesotho, and KwaZulu-
Natal, Free State and Eastern Cape Provinces in South Africa (Wittmayer and  Büscher 
2010; Republic of South Africa 2015). Because of the existing park and reserve structures, 
the geographic extent of the TFCA, and the bureaucratic and political complexity of the trans-
border programme, the MDTFCA actually encompasses a varied range of land tenure 
systems and environmental and development interventions and projects related to managed 
natural resources, cultural heritage areas, and strict ‘wilderness’ sites; land care and 
rehabilitation; tourism; livestock care and management; improving irrigation and handicrafts 
and other skills-building. As a result, local ‘experience’ and opinion, as well as the potential 
for conflicts associated with the programme, are extremely varied across the programme’s 
area and across jurisdictional levels. 
 
According to the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Programme, the aims of the PA are to 
‘conserve and sustainably manage the globally significant natural and cultural heritage of the 
Maloti and Drakensberg mountains’, the source of 25 per cent of South Africa’s fresh water 
through runoff, dams and international transfers, and to promote development through the 
sustainable use of the many economic opportunities presented by the PA – especially 
around tourism (Republic of South Africa 2015; MDTP 2007; Blignaut et al. 2010). Another 
important aspect of MDTFCA planning has been around instituting PES. In a general sense, 
PES schemes compensate land owners and land users for behavioural adjustments that 
result in changes in land use management and practices aimed at increasing ‘the flow of 
ecosystem services’ (Blignaut et al. 2010). These practices may include ecosystem 
restoration or preservation activities with positive intended ecological impacts such as, for 
example, improved grassland or riparian ecosystem functioning, improving soil or standing 
forest carbon storage, improved water filtration functions and reduced erosion. 
 
After a long planning period that began in the 1990s, in 2001 a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) was signed between the two countries, and the PA was developed 
over two long implementation phases. These included a preparatory policy phase, funded by 
the GEF of the World Bank, that lasted from 2002–07 and produced the twenty-year 
conservation and development strategy and the first five-year action plan for the area, and a 
second pilot phase that was co-funded by the governments of South Africa and Lesotho, 
lasting from 2008 to 2012 (but may still be ongoing), that meant to test the first five-year plan 
and feed into a third phase for which precise details are currently unavailable at the time of 
writing (Republic of South Africa 2015). The MDTFCA is currently operated under the Maloti-
Drakensberg Transfrontier Park / uKhahlamba Drakensberg Park World Heritage Site / 
Sehlabathebe National Park Joint Management Plan (MDTP 2012). 
 
Midway through the first phase of the project, significant challenges to planning and 
implementation became evident due to the ‘inherent complexity of the project’, the significant 
social, institutional and economic differences between Lesotho and South Africa, as well as 
different visions and goals for the PA, which resulted in a drifting apart between the two 
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countries’ respective Project Coordination Committees (PCCs) (Murray and Aitken 2006; 
Büscher and de Beer 2011). According to Büscher and de Beer (2011), challenges have 
hampered effective governance of the project throughout, including the short-term dynamics 
of policy planning, tension between technical, ‘hard science’ approaches to bio-regional 
planning favoured by the South African PCC and ‘moral’, participatory, anthropocentric 
approaches to development goals on the part of the Lesotho PCC, and increasing gaps 
between policy framings and practice (Büscher and de Beer 2011). 
 
Over the course of the planning phase, interpersonal and conceptual conflicts between the 
two PCCs grew increasingly problematic. These included conflicts around hiring for 
administrative positions, around assessment approaches and disagreements over the 
constitution of ‘community-based’ approaches. With growing antagonism, the PCCs 
competed with one another for legitimacy and acceptance, and both sides took action to 
marginalise the other in the planning process, and to de-legitimise the other in the eyes of 
donors. Poor relations shifted the two PCCs towards increasing competition over ‘buy-ins’ 
from stakeholders for future project implementation, and increased the significance of 
environmental-economic conservation orientations and market-like policy mechanisms for 
environmental management, including PES. The fragile relations among the PCCs eventually 
degraded to the point at which independent mediators had to be brought in (Büscher 2012; 
Büscher 2010). 
 
Both before and after the establishment of the MDTFCA, the area had been depicted by 
many authors as an ideal site for successful implementation of a PES system around water 
resources (Büscher 2012; Blignaut et al. 2010; Mander 2008). By the time the MDTFCA was 
established, PES had become increasingly popular internationally as well as a market-like 
policy instrument for natural resource management, but was not a part of original TFCA 
implementation plans (Büscher 2012). PES became a further source of antagonism in the 
MDTFCA planning and implementation process, advocated by the South African PCC as a 
‘magic bullet’ for conservation, complementary to their favoured bio-regional approach, and 
resisted by the Lesotho PCC which held the position that adding PES to an already 
complicated management framework would distract from focused implementation plans. 
Over Lesotho’s objections, the South African PCC commissioned a PES baseline study, the 
report from which glossed over problems in the collaboration and framed the MDTFCA as an 
emerging ecosystem services market, a position that donors eagerly embraced (Büscher 
2012). In the end, the MDTFCA has come to be oriented around the bio-regional approach, 
and PES (although PES has not been systematically implemented in the PA), both positions 
advocated by the South African PCC and resisted by Lesotho’s PCC. 
 
Planning conflicts between the PCCs of South Africa and Lesotho reflect the fact that, 
despite portrayals of their collaboration over the MDTFCA as promoting peace and 
international cooperation, South Africa and Lesotho are incredibly uneven partners (Büscher 
2010). Even though it is a sovereign nation, the territory of Lesotho is completely enclaved 
within the territorial boundaries of South Africa. Lesotho is economically dependent on South 
Africa for markets for agricultural products and employment in South African mines, and the 
two countries have a historically tense and contentious political and economic relationship. 
Amidst this historical and contextual complexity, it is difficult for conservation actors to 
navigate the diverse social, political and economic pressures on people and land, and 
constructively combine them with biodiversity conservation (Büscher 2012). In this context, 
market-like policy instruments can be powerful tools and sources of conflict in the 
policymaking sphere, regardless of their effectiveness in achieving on-the-ground resource 
management and development goals. As demonstrated in the case of the MDTFCA, the 
international popularity and ‘win-win’ promise of PES and other NRF instruments can be 
applied by competing actors in conflictual policy situations to legitimate claims and positions, 
and dominate planning relationships and processes. 
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7  Conclusions 
 
As discussed in the introductory section of this report, the broad appeals of green economy 
approaches and NRF to environmental conservation and development lie in a bundled 
package of policy promises: adaptation to minimise the harmful impacts of global climate 
change, preservation of crucial ecosystem functions, and capturing ‘triple-win’ opportunities 
for achieving socially inclusive environmental sustainability, economic growth, and poverty 
alleviation through policy reform on one hand, and the promise to make both the global 
economy and the global environment ‘work’ to support one another, while providing offsets to 
mitigate environmentally destructive industrial activities and generating streams of income for 
cash-strapped local communities to invest in infrastructure and development initiatives on the 
other (UNDP 2012). 
7.1  The burden of the public sector in developing countries 
According to Vahanen and colleagues, ‘what many tropical forested African countries are 
bringing to the table is the political willingness and political capital to offer their forests for 
public good to the world for reducing emissions’ (2009: 139). Even with willingness to make 
political commitments, a particularly problematic aspect of the UN green economy 
framework is the fact that the public sectors of developing countries carry the greatest 
burden of responsibility and risk in realising global green economy transitions. As the SADC 
Secretariat points out in discussing practical realities and constraints to sub-regional 
integration around environmental mainstreaming among member states, challenges to 
realising green economy transitions in Southern African countries include both long-standing 
and new or emerging challenges. Long-standing constraints to implementation of green 
economy reforms are linked to technocratic gridlock; pervasive institutional weaknesses and 
poor capacity for transitions in different countries; lack of access to financial, technical and 
human resources; over-dependence of the region and member states on international donor 
funding; ongoing intra-regional dependency on South Africa; and institutional ‘misalignment’ 
across countries. These long-standing circumstances intersect with new and emerging 
challenges, including the overlapping crises of 2008–09: persistent poverty; HIV/AIDS and 
gender inequity; and failed attempts to create employment, entrepreneurship, and trade 
opportunities (SADC 2010, 2011, 2013b). Furthermore, these challenges are faced by 
countries in regional and global contexts of historical dependencies and rising inequalities. 
As demonstrated by the case of the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation Area, 
highly uneven collaborations can result in conflicts that unfold in the process of cross-border 
planning. 
7.2  Policy transitions and the value of natural resources 
Rather than a concrete departure from prior paradigms of environmental governance and 
development, the green economy builds upon a conceptual basis established in the 1980s in 
environmental economics, embracing and integrating concepts of scarcity, degradation and 
market metaphors for natural processes and degradation. It also builds upon an international 
institutional policy structure that was established from the 1990s onward under the banner of 
sustainable development. Arguably, the primary point of departure is the salience of NRF, 
the application of which is a means to establish stronger linkages between the functions of 
environmental resources in situ, economic growth and the viability of global financial 
markets. 
 
In doing so, it may be argued that NRF policies are creating a new class of non-extractive 
high-value conservation resources – monetised natural capital assets – on which 
environmental derivatives are based. While extractive high-value resources have long been 
47 
 
the subject of conflict and civil unrest in developing countries, it is likely that this new class of 
high-value resources will be implicated in new forms of conflict that play out around 
ecosystems, assessment techniques and certification schemes. These reforms and 
programmes build upon prior conservation regimes which often already possess deep 
histories of negotiation, compromise and conflict among, for example, groups of local 
resource users; state agencies and representatives; local and regional security personnel; 
private companies and foundations and local, national and international NGOs around issues 
of resource access rights, participation in governance, equity and recompense, autonomy, 
identity and legitimacy. 
 
Because of these legacies, the political economy of NRF, and due to the fact that resources 
in question cannot be extracted and traded in informal markets, conflicts that arise around 
natural resource financialization are likely to more closely resemble ‘conservation conflicts’ 
and clashes over basic understandings of phenomena, policy objectives or implementation 
practices related to NRF-related policy reforms and planning, in which one group is able to 
exert its interests over those of others (Redpath et al. 2013: 100). In this framing, conflict 
may result in violence, but may also result in tensions, ideological insurgencies, new social 
movements and other forms of antagonism and resistance. In the context of environmental 
planning, policy-relevant scientific debates, and policy change, conflicts can arise on different 
jurisdictional levels and cross scales, involve diverse actors, organisations and governance 
structures. Yet, the extent to which conflicts around high-value resources in the context of 
conservation resembles prior conservation conflicts remains to be seen. 
7.3  Conflict potential in implementation settings 
The case studies presented in this report focus on biodiversity offsetting in the context of 
mineral extraction in Madagascar, the undermining of community-based forestry 
management in the context of REDD+ planning in Tanzania, and planning conflicts in the 
establishment of a transfrontier PA straddling the border dividing South Africa and Lesotho. 
Taken together, these cases demonstrate how international programming can intersect with 
national social and policy histories to unfold in unpredictable and often conflictual, ways. 
 
The case from Madagascar highlights important dynamics around the sub-national ‘unfolding’ 
of green growth strategies, including the relative roles of states, private sector actors, NGOs 
and local populations in facilitating green growth schemes, and specifically how NRF and 
offsetting can both buttress relationships and exacerbate historical inequities between 
diverse groups of actors in low-income settings. This case additionally underscores the ways 
in which NRF, in practice, can blur distinctions between public and private domains, 
environmental stewardship and environmental degradation, voluntary and compliance market 
domains, and social inclusion and exclusion in particular project contexts. 
 
The case from Suledo Forest Reserve in Tanzania demonstrates how, contrary to policy 
framings, emerging REDD+ policies are at odds with CBFM due to the stark differences in 
practice between managing forests to maintain ‘standing carbon’ under a national REDD+ 
strategy, and sustainably managing forests for multiple and flexible purposes based on the 
needs and priorities of local communities. This ‘policy paradox’ has begun to contribute to a 
retrenchment of centralised top-down approaches to forest management in Tanzania, a 
country with an international reputation built upon the theme of decentralised and 
community-based wildlife and forest management schemes. 
 
Departing from the ‘local’ context of NRF, the example from the Maloti-Drakensberg 
Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area demonstrates how planning conflicts 
between South Africa and Lesotho reflect the fact that, despite portrayals of their 
collaboration over the PA as promoting peace and international cooperation, uneven 
partnerships can lead to conflict, and the international popularity and ‘win-win’ promise of 
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PES and other NRF instruments can be applied by competing actors in conflictual policy 
situations to legitimate claims and positions, and dominate planning relationships and 
processes. 
 
Evidence from case studies suggests that, while the intent of reforms may be the realisation 
of more inclusive, equitable and less environmentally hazardous futures, policy framings and 
reporting – from international to sub-national levels – they have a tendency to obscure the 
social and ecological challenges and complexities of policy implementation, emerging 
inequities and conflict potentials around these new resource regimes, highlighting the need 
for increased empirical work around unfolding relationships between green economy policy 
and emerging conflict dynamics. Results of this report also demonstrate a source of 
disjuncture in green economy policy – that environmental problems have arisen as a result of 
dynamic interactions among social, ecological and technical systems, yet dominant policy 
framings of these problems rely on largely ahistorical and simplified depictions of causality, 
crisis, scarcity and resolution, and dominant practice around addressing them relies on 
increasingly managerial and technical approaches that themselves may lead to the creation 
of new problems and crises (Leach et al. 2010). As we move forward, it is important to 
develop rigorous and transparent means of identifying and assessing interactions, 
articulations, and emerging outcomes, crises and possibilities that arise in the context of 
transformative policy changes that are simultaneously global, regional and local, and natural, 
social and economic. 
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